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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

July, 1944

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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

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GEORGE SANTAYANA

VERGILIUS FERM

The College of Wooster

I RECALL an amusing incident in connection with the name of George Santayana. It occurred a few years ago shortly after the publication of his widely heralded novel *The Last Puritan.* A professor of philosophy had picked up the book eagerly wishing to see how so profound a thinker as Santayana would go about writing a novel. He read on and on with increasing lack of interest. The book had little flutter to it; the novel was plainly "dry." Things did not happen except that there was the hero, a boy, who grew normally to manhood, went to school and college—a life without any great tragedy or comedy, with no hint of struggle, not even the complication of an affair of love. It was a most ordinary story.

The same summer this professor of philosophy happened to visit a home where he found the novel open on the table. Introduced to the middle-aged hostess, each a stranger to the other, the professor inquired of her how she enjoyed the new novel. "It is magnificent, splendid," replied the lady. "I have been thrilled by it." To which the professor remarked: "I, too, have been reading it. But I can't get anywhere in it. I frankly do not enjoy it." Looking at her guest the hostess proudly remarked: "It's not everybody who can read such a book. It's pretty philosophical!" And there the conversation turned to commonplaces.

This incident may serve as an appropriate introduction to Santayana. Few, indeed, understand him—even professional philosophers, many of them, regard him as a fog. He is beyond ordinary classifications. One thinks one has gotten hold of him; and then understanding fades. There are moments when the Santayanan vision comes; and there are long dry spells when the thing is lost. One has his Santayana days; and again one has them not. You either catch him unawares or he is the most opaque thinker imaginable. He teases you on to something, and while you are ready to grasp the new turn of thought he shocks you with some phrase which tells you that you are on a dead-end street.

Literary people, however, find their god in Santayana. He is not the conventionally systematic man that the academic philosopher holds up as the ideal metaphysician. He dashes here and there over the landscape with aphorisms that stick even though the related thought is either completely

unseen or forgotten. He writes with a poetic pen and justifies his philosophy as poetry. It is by a kind of artistic splendor that the content seeps through. He is the bane of any student who would try to outline him. One cannot by a first or second reading place Santayana in the conventional type of philosophical framework. That would be cold prose. And prose always remains foreign to such elastic and excursive minds. One has to do just what this writer is now doing: keep on writing and let the words casually introduce the thought—if one wishes to apprehend the mind of Santayana. One cannot, indeed, paraphrase him; for the simple reason that Santayana is a literary mind which dwells with the elect on a literary Mt. Olympus. Our words are no match for his. Our rhetoric is barbaric in comparison. Our style is too stiff to translate the ineffable elegance which marks his every page.

In spite of Santayana's disclaim for any system of thought, he has one underneath and between his lines. Long before a beginner sees the Santayanan light he will be thrilled, as if by a cloud, by the pages of words and phrases tripping merrily along.

Among the many expositions there is one short account of Santayana which comes about as close to shedding light upon the panorama of his thought as anything I know. It is the essay by Professor T. V. Smith entitled "The Æsthetic Way of Life with George Santayana as Guide."[1] This essay has a swing to it that approaches the Santayanan style. Perhaps one has to have a certain quality of temperament, iconoclastic yet lyric, something paradoxical and unconventional yet mellow in one's make-up, to be a true interpreter of such a mind.

Santayana was born in Madrid, December 16, 1863. Before he reached his teens he was brought to America, where he was to make his home for forty years. He was the son of a Spaniard who held a post for his government. The wide open spaces of the sea were made as familiar to him by his many ocean voyages as the prairie becomes commonplace to a Kansan. Few philosophers have gotten around in the world as much as he. Wherein they may excel as technical academic scholars, his contentment lay in building his view of the world by whatever everyday impressions came through the myriad stimuli of the senses. Santayana never got over the influence of his sense impressions, and his philosophy bears witness to a love and respect for the humanly neutral character of father nature.

The only son by a late marriage, the boy grew up in a kind of solitariness. His playmates were few, as were his games. He read hungrily—enjoying geography and architecture and the rich and complicated manifestations of what men call religion. The pageantry of the church of his

[1] *The Philosophic Way of Life* (1929).

heritage, the Roman Catholic, to which he early became attuned, never lost its appeal although he never participated in formal religious exercise so that one could detect discipleship. The stories about the creation and the fall, including the fallen angels, the flood, the drama of atonement and redemption and the whole stock and trade of what Protestants teach in their Sunday-school literature remained real to his imagination and respect although his own sophistication placed the whole business in the land of fairy tales. The doctrine of God as the absentee landlord, categorically called *deism* by philosophers, was made familiar to him by the open confessions of faith on the part of his father and mother; and this doctrine finds its counterpart in his maturer philosophy where he denies the conventional God.

He was his father's son rather than his mother's. His autobiographical account in *The Last Puritan* shows this clearly. The mother kept herself in Boston, educating her first brood of children and giving to them the privileged place of the Bostonian Sturgises. When George came to live with his mother and stepbrothers and stepsisters, he was marked, not unkindly, as not of the Sturgises, and he was much younger. A Harvard education was most natural. They would make of him a Harvard man, and they did up to a point. That point ended with Santayana himself. He had sprawled himself out too much in the world to permit localization. And he seemed never to feel quite at home with either Harvard or anything American. In fact he never felt so much at home at any one place that one could detect local color. Somehow one feels that an appropriate address for him would be "George Santayana, the Earth, formerly of Cambridge, America, now in care of Rome, Italy, or, if not there, try Spain." One never rightly associates Santayana with the name Spaniard, American, or even professor. His utter individualism lay in his surrender to a kind of naturalistic universalism.

The philosophical gods of Harvard spotted him early enough to encourage him toward a career in academic philosophy. They gave him a traveling fellowship, and he wrote back almost too carelessly that he was not cut out for such living and that he found no school or man in Europe to which he could give any kind of allegiance or loyalty. His counselor, Professor William James, who had childlike faith in all of his students, counseled him more than once to observe the customary amenities of writing out formal reports of his progress; and he obeyed with half-hearted replies which more or less betrayed a cynical taste for the whole business of academic cold storage. He even suggested that another young scholar at Harvard might well be offered the fellowship, someone with more promise. And the authorities renewed it for him.

Few scholars have had the opportunity which was his. He sat under some of the most eminent men of his day in the cultural centres of Europe; he attended the intimate fellowships of the Sunday-night "at homes" of illustrious professors in discussions with promising students and academic luminaries. And he reported to his boss at home that while he enjoyed himself he felt as scattered in his thinking as before. No one, it seemed to him, had caught an interpretation of the world quite in the line with the way the world was shaping itself to him. And yet he was not so sure how it seemed to him.

President Eliot, who was unimpressed by the new teacher in philosophy—Santayana had been made instructor the year of his doctorate at Harvard—received a letter from Professor James asking for his promotion. This recommendation characterized the young instructor as very honest, unworldly, wholesome, a spectator rather than an actor, gentleman, exquisite writer and finished speaker, and a rare and precious type. It turned out that Santayana brought fame not only to himself as a teacher and interpreter but to Harvard as well. It was an irreparable loss to the university and to America, when, at still a young age, he resigned in favor of a life unencumbered by academic routine. His zenith years were to be spent abroad in the leisure of reading and reflection and occasional travel.

Santayana's thought may be best classified, if classification is what we want, as a species of naturalism. Hard, cold, mechanical nature is the base of his whole thought. It is here that one begins when one tries to get hold of his philosophy. We are, he says, accidents of nature. We emerge from the physical womb and pass our lives in necessary obeisance to physical laws. We must eat, clothe ourselves, and rest and sport about. Our lives are literally grounded. From dust to dust marks the limits of our sojourn. Nature is not something which we must eschew. It is something that we have to accept. And, accepting it, we must make the most of our episode while it lasts. Much like the animals, we find our way about, acting upon our environment much as they, in trial and error, and in a faith that grasps without complete understanding. This he calls animal faith." We live practically rather than act theoretically. Our selves are products of this earthy existence.

I like to think of Santayana's view of life in terms of the sea. The sea is physical nature. It is mighty. Fundamentally, it is all that there is. But the sea has its goings ons. The waves are the sea swollen, reaching heights and depths. And the waves have their caps and sprays. The foam is, indeed, of the wave but it is the sea in its most unusual expression. The foam reveals the sea in a most peculiar quality. Although of the sea, the foam is something which the sea in itself does not reveal except on

occasion and under special circumstances. Foam is foam, although the sea is responsible for it.

Now the mind is the foam or the spray of the sea. It appears in nature only by the permission of nature. But once it appears, it shows forth a glory unimaginable in terms of that which produced it. It appears with a qualitative greatness and to all appearances unique. But, like the foam, it has its short life; and it will soon return to nature which brought it into being. When we think, we are physical nature revealing itself to itself. Our mental life is generated in this world, emerges in this world, takes flights into the heights and depths, only to pass away, to be absorbed once more into the mighty awfulness of its physical setting.

Santayana did not believe in personal immortality. One lives on in the ideals caught up by others in thought, and one perishes only in the sense that the episode perishes. The sea or reality itself absorbs every wave, and so we endure in the whole. This double doctrine of immortality is, on the one hand, the immortality of influence, and, on the other, the immortality of absorption.

So far we have said nothing of his famous doctrine of "essences." To this rather difficult concept we must now turn as it gives a peculiar twist to his otherwise crassly materialistic philosophy.

One of Professor Santayana's famous courses at Harvard was given over to a study of Plato. It was Plato who made famous the doctrine that the universals are the real existences. For instance, it is not this particular chair nor that one that makes chairs chairs. We have all kinds of chairs but nevertheless they are all chairs. The universal chair makes chairs chairs. Were it not for this universal, the particulars would not be what they are. For Plato these universals pre-exist, exist, and postexist. They are "beyond" their particular expressions. They are eternal ideas. They constitute the real stuff of all that is. When writers, therefore, speak of the Platonism in Santayana they refer to the similarity of the Santayanan essences to the Platonic ideas. Both are eternal, universal, immediately known in thought, static entities, original, unique, complete, infinite in number, and true objects of philosophical contemplation.

But with all their similarity essences and Platonic universals have fundamental differences. For Plato, the universals are values, orders of worth with a Supreme Goodness and Beauty at the top in a pre-existent hierarchy. For Santayana these essences are neutral, neither good nor bad. Only one virtue they possess in common: they possess æsthetic or logical significance. We entertain and enjoy them in the inmost depths of thought and feeling, not so much as "objects" but as the very constitutive elements of thought and feeling. And again, there is a fundamental difference. While, for Plato, these universals exist and are of the essence of all that

there is in the whole world, for Santayana, these essences do not exist, and they do not influence the course of brutal nature. Nature, indeed, discloses them in so far as they appear to the mind (itself the product of nature); but nature does not produce them as such, for they do not exist as do things of nature. Minds "find" them in the process of reflection, stumble upon them, apprehend them as "subsistents" in their own realm.

Perhaps an analogy might, up to a point, illustrate this.

Strike a match. A beautiful flame follows. This flame owes something of itself to the fact that the match was originally there and struck. But the flame is something more than the match. It is liquid warmth and liquid light. Imagine this liquidity as not something that exists as did the match but a quality peculiar to its own genius, not translatable to anything consonant with the match. If you can so imagine it, you have a peculiar kind of subsistence. Essences are somewhat like the warmth, the glow, the color, the sheer beauty of the flame; not, mind you, the flame conceived of as molecular changes, but as a qualitative uniqueness. They are like the flamishness of the flame. Spread the imagination once more to cover all flame-qualities in a kind of "realm apart," and you have the universal character of subsistence before you.

Now, in thought, we come upon these essences. They are immediately given. We possess them as immediate data. They form the raw material of thinking. We could not think without their presence in thought. They stand between us and the world of physical objects.[2] And they introduce us into the mental fairyland of universals. Were these not universals, man could neither think nor communicate. When I say "chair," I refer the concept to the essence which is there in my mind. It is a pure, underived, datum. This essence "refers" to physical objects called, by me, chairs. And this essence introduces me to a realm of essence in which other concepts refer. All concepts, however, are once removed from the realm of pure essences. My ideas are representations and superadditions upon these original data. But there they are: universal, neutral, eternal subsistents; eternal in the sense that they are not created by me or by anyone else; they are of their own nature and of their own kind, independent and untouched by wind or weather, and remain as absolutes in the realm of mind wherein they are found. They constitute not only what is recognized in thought but all possible forms of thought and of the wildest imagination.

It is the philosopher's delight to revel in the realm of essence. That

[2] Santayana held that between a physical object and a mind apprehending the object there is this veil of "essence" which refers minds to existing things. This doctrine is a form of the theory known by the school of "Critical Realism."

is why, perhaps, he is misunderstood. Indeed, he like all men, must feed his body, and pay his respects to the things of this earth. But there are privileged flights of fancy and imagination which we are all called on to undertake in this nonexistent Beulah land. Since the philosopher enjoys contemplation, he has aspired to the highest calling of man; he alone achieves emancipation or salvation. It is the one "place" where we can be alone and yet in company with spirit. It is the one entrance into what has long been called by man the "spiritual realm."

Indeed, man is a spirit. But the spiritual realm is not an existent realm as the theologians and ecclesiastics and many philosophers have held. Men have mistaken subsistence for existence. The spiritual world is a peculiar dimensional realm having qualities unlike the dimensional. It is no place, nowhere, beyond time, beyond the categories of existing nature. It is the "home" of ideals, fairy tales, imaginational sprees, of beauty, of wonder, of bliss. It is the one place where we can take refuge when the storms of a blistering world break upon us. We make of these essences ideal moral qualities although in themselves they are neutral. And there is solace and joy in allowing the imagination to go riot. Who has stooped so low as not to enjoy his dreams?

The little child has this spirit, and he may be the best interpreter of life. Consider the little child. We tell him bedtime stories and fill his imagination to the full. He asks for more and more and more. Who is he that has not been moved by the child's plaintive cry, "Daddy, tell me another story"? It is life to him. Stories remove him from the common drab of things. They make him forget his pains and his troubles. But no child continues to believe them except in terms of his fairyland. He may play "make-believe" and talk to his nonexistent heroes. Nonexistences form a part of the sweep of his imagination. And yet, he drops them at will. He can slough off his fairy story at the sight of a new bicycle or a cookie. That there are these two realms does not upset him. He takes his toy and his cake as real existence and does not let the fairy fool him on these. But when he enters his fairyland he does not allow his senses to thwart him by a tempting skepticism. The child is wise. He renders unto the fairyland the things that belong there and to the real world of bumps and bruises the things that belong there.

But not so man. He mixes up the awful truth. He believes many of his fairy tales as existing in the realm of fact. He imagines his gods and then believes in them as working in the world. He revels in symbols and then gets down and worships these symbols as if they were existents. He manufactures a hierarchy of angels and demons and then lugs them all out of their subsistent realm and displays them as a part of the existing world. Man does not remember his childhood. He mixes his realms. He

believes in a god as the creative and benevolent spirit which sustains and directs the world. But such gods are figments of his untempered imagination. They subsist. There are no gods except fairy gods. Should men, then, destroy them?

Yes, if you mean that they should be believed and trusted as members of existence. No, if you mean that they should be enjoyed in the realm of ideals. Men may and ought to continue to worship only if they worship in the right realm. Men, indeed, should have their gods, their religion, their theologies; but all these products should wear the stamp of their source, "made in the realm of the imagination."

The world of physical nature shows no evidence of a Benevolence that is akin to the spirit. Spirit does not guide this world. It is guided by the cruel destiny of wind and weather and storm and sea. Man is ever the reed broken by the mechanics of circumstance. He did not choose his existence. Existence was thrust upon him. The world shows no purpose unless it be its purposelessness. Existence is aimless as the wind. We play false when we read subsistent ideals into existence. The world, indeed, shows plenty of power, but it does not hold out goodness. Germs and tragic accidents are no respecters of men or beasts, however valuable they may seem. The traditional God is Supreme Power and Goodness wedded into One Existence. But where is there goodness in this world except in the flighty excursions of the human imagination? Nature is fundamentally cruel, and only bad illusions are fashioned by idealistic philosophers and theologians when they dress it up in the garments of their ideals.

Shall we, then, do away with all our churches, our rituals, our religious stories and dramas? By no means. They are useful if understood for what they are worth. They are counterfeit if they are made into metaphysical coin. Our churches may furnish for us stimulation to dream our dreams; our rituals should help us to catch the artist's vision; our religious stories and dramas should liberate us from our monotonous selves and take from us, even for a while, the drab and commonplace experiences of existence. All these should make us as little children once more. They should open up the meadowlands of subsistence and allow us to dream impossible dreams. Then only will they help us to our true salvation, the only solace we can hope to find. The foam on the waves is beautiful while it lasts. Let us make the most of our enjoyment in flights of reckless imagination; soon enough we shall be called back from our musings by the harsh command of the sergeant of nature, to attend to the routine drill of eking out our existence, fighting the nose cold and the onslaught of hungry germs. Blessed is the man who finds himself even for a while in the company of spirit. The realm of spirit is eternal because it

cannot be touched in its purity and in its heights by the vicissitudes of the flesh; and, under favorable circumstances, it can be found by others who come after. Flesh can call man away, but flesh cannot take from him the good while it lasts. The play life of our dreams is our happiest; let us make the most of it. Mythical ideals have beauty but they have no power. They cannot dip into physical nature to change its course. They may be worshiped, but they cannot be implicated except as human tonics or as sedatives while the Big Machine grinds out its machinations.

It should be clear from this why Santayana continued to pay his respects to Roman Catholicism. The Catholic Church always has shown an artistry in the poetry of its ritual and dramatic ideas. It should be clear, too, why Santayana could never be classified a devotee of Catholicism with its confusion of poetry and prose. It should be expected that Santayana would speak with irritation of Protestants. Protestants, he said in effect, were to him sanctimonious aliens full of unintelligible zeal and moral restlessness. Protestantism calls on the gods to sustain its own waywardness and subjective feelings; like the philosophical idealists (who smell of ministerial piety) Protestants would clothe nature with gowns of respectability when nature in the raw deserves no such splendor.

Beauty, he said, is something enjoyed for itself. It has no further function. It is something which humans possess but which physical nature lacks. There is something of an illusionary character about beauty: it smears objects with subjective feeling. The objectification of the subjective emotions is a common illusion. If we were to give our own title to this, we might call it the æstho-pathetic fallacy. Beauty is first and last a subjective experience. But it is more than that in the realm of subsistence; here it is pleasure objectified. The sense of beauty weaves together the materials of sense and form into ideal imaginings.

What, then, is the end of life? For Santayana it is happiness. Pleasure alone sanctions living and keeps men from going mad. But the end of life is also death. Ought not the transitory character of life make men sad? Indeed, it does—but only under a sentimental illusion. We do not feel sad because in life we experience a series of beginnings and endings; we discharge our duties and are done with them. Life is a process of redeeming our pledges; when redeemed, there is no need for more. We do not dread the death of sleep we pass through each night. We should gladly, cleanly, and without distraction live our lives and not scent after infinity which does not belong to us. Only physical nature has whatever infinity there is. While we are here, let us spread the ideal of happiness; a society that is happy is better than a society where all would be equal. The happy person needs only enough to keep healthy. Happiness is a state of mind imposed by mind upon a neutral world. Beauty and

happiness sleep in the same bed, and that bed is a piece of furniture only in the realm of ideals.

Perhaps the reader should have in mind the publications which show forth the Santayanan conception of the world and life. His major work is in five volumes published in 1905-1906 under the title *The Life of Reason.* Though in five separate books, this series is one whole: an account of the life of man's reason as it rationalizes the world of circumstance. Man is a rational animal pursuing ideals, generated by the two monsters "impulse" and "ideas." *The Life of Reason* is a history and evaluation of man's attempt to live life according to a realization of his ideals. The undercurrent is naturalism. Man is a part of brute nature and circumscribed by it. His ideals set in the framework of the world have misled him to make extravagant claims of nature. Their habitat, as we have seen, lies in a realm apart. With biting irony the author shows these illusions of man and essays to put man's reason in its proper place. Man seeks happiness and rightly so; but his happiness lies in other places than those wherein he has futilely sought it. The life of reason is a commentary on Santayana's own life: like the contemporaries of his own generation, he had been divided and torn apart by the apparent contradictions of "science" and "religion," of cold and brutal facts and ideals, of mechanical necessity and purpose—all resolved for him by his conviction that there are realms or spheres which work out their own characteristics. The life of reason is a solution of the antinomies of experience, a solution simple enough by the divorcement of each phase to its proper sphere.

It must be remembered that when he was a young man there was much discussion of the effect on traditional views of life of the new scientific knowledge. Psychology was gradually submerging itself under biology. It was within a few short years that behaviorism, the school which reduces the entire psyche to biological reactions, was to flourish and Santayana was to give his blessing. The scientific method was sticking its ugly head into many a traditional tent: Tylor and Spencer had been investigating primitive religions and had revealed data showing how natural all religion is; higher criticism was playing havoc with supernatural theories of the Bible; Buckle was revealing how cultural movements were shadows of natural phenomena, of climate, soil, and the abundance or scarcity of food. Auguste Comte announced a new metaphysics which was to end all metaphysics, a positive philosophy in which all behavior was to be explained by natural causes within the scope of man; Herbert Spencer had already gained a prophetic position of ultimate agnosticism with his epoch-making synthesis, interpreting life as a grand evolutionary process governed by the laws of masses and forces. There were men like Huxley and Taine, and Renan and Haeckel—all of whom

taught revolutionary ideas slashing sacred traditions with their cruel tirades of rationalism and materialism. Professor James, who came to philosophy by way of medicine and the scientific temper, Santayana always admired. When James departed from his caution and dreamed metaphysical air castles, Santayana voiced his protest. Professor Royce's idealism he considered a vestigial form of cleric piety. Naturalism was nothing new with Santayana. It was as old as the Greeks, and it had its revival in the student days of his absorption.

The Life of Reason began first with an essay on "Reason in Common Sense," in which the world of nature is made clear by a formal definition: the name for that realm of existences which lies outside the pale of our wishes. Boldly the thesis of naturalism is announced and expounded. In the four subsequent volumes the same ideas are elaborated, in spite of his own distaste for a formal philosophy, into a comprehensive and consistent system: "Reason in Society," "Reason in Religion," "Reason in Art," and "Reason in Science." A panoramic view of historical ideas flows in and out of these pages: one sees the Santayanan vision in his ironical criticism of man's history of his own illusions.

Sixteen years after this great work there appeared the introduction to another series, a synthesis to be called *Realms of Being.* In 1923 *Scepticism and Animal Faith* was published as an introduction. Then followed *The Realm of Essence* in 1927, *The Realm of Matter* in 1930, *The Realm of Truth* in 1937, and *The Realm of Spirit* in 1940. Thus, the landscape is surveyed and each domain carefully scrutinized and properly catalogued.

In spite of his wishes there has arisen a Santayanan cult—not organized, to be sure, but nevertheless a cult. In the writings of younger philosophers, here and there, one sees the Santayanan influence. No one can read this master's works without unconsciously attempting to imitate his style, without taking courage to express himself freely and untraditionally, and sensing the freshness of a truly philosophical breeze. Those who are timid about their own powers take heart when they read Santayana. For did he not live the lesson he so firmly believed: that a philosopher, above all things, should be himself and not follow a prescribed pattern? Did he not boldly cut his own figure? Should not the true philosopher feel immune to the standards set by bygone ages and the lesser thinkers who shine only by imitation? One may disagree with him, but one cannot fail to be inspired by his frankness and honesty and his utter individualism. Few philosophers have the courage to say the things he said; he was willing to be called a sinner and win his place in spite of academic diffidence and even contempt.

He had his way of looking at life and that was all that was necessary.

He had no aspirations to form a society or a school or to send out philosophical missionaries for his cause. He was generous and kind to his students but he aspired not to influence them consciously. He was simply George Santayana, man of the world, truly cultured, using his gifts which were rich in him, uttering his praise and contempt freely and then seeking the solitude which he thought rightly belonged to him. The world tends to smother potential geniuses and make of them ordinary mortals by the demands of convention and conservative caution. It never succeeded with him. The humanism he taught may be the humanism of the privileged, for those who do not have to bear the burdens of eking out an existence; but it is a humanism which is truly ideal in the one realm wherein men can seek contentment amidst the storms and stresses that drag the spirit down. Santayana belongs to the roster of wholesome heretics. In philosophy heresy has its privileged place, and he made the most of that privilege. In the solitude of his own soul he found the reward and the one haven of peace in a puzzling and bedeviled world. Strange as it may seem, this materialist, this lover of Greek naturalism, finds his true companions with the great mystics who, too, were disillusioned by man's fitful concern with the flux of a coldly material world.

POETRY AND RELIGION

HAROLD A. TAYLOR

University of Wisconsin

The religious view of the universe is essentially poetic. It conceives reality as the presence before us of events produced by a spiritual agency, an agency whose existence makes our universe not only possible, but actual. It is a natural way of conceiving reality. It appeals to the desire of human beings for simple, imaginative explanations of the way things behave. On the one hand, it satisfies the requirement set by the reason that an explanation must be capable of some degree of rational belief. On the other, it fulfills the need for explanations which stimulate and satisfy the emotions.

The human mind, when it begins to be conscious of the facts of its native experience, is unavoidably driven to construct explanations. They become necessary in order to bring some orderly principles for living from the chaotic flow of immediate experience and its diverse objects. The most convenient ideas about the nature of life are those which appeal immediately to the reason and the imagination, without undue intellectual elaboration or analysis. Such ideas make a synthesis of all experience, give an acceptable account of the purpose of human life, and provide a philosophy by which it is possible to live. Religious ideas are of this sort. They interpret poetically and easily the nature of our world. For this reason, they seem to be the most fundamental type of philosophical idea man has produced.

We find the same development of imaginative description of the universe in those primitive societies whose metaphysics we have come to know. Explanations about the way the universe operates are given in terms of the acts of great personalities who achieve concrete effects in our world by their spiritual otherworldly operations. The basic philosophy of primitive societies is a religious doctrine based upon a poetic myth or allegory.

Our modern society is intellectually rather close to that metaphysical position. In the more primitive communities, the economic, political, and social doctrines flow directly from religion. In our industrialized society, religious concepts determine to a large extent the purposes and values of human life, while empirical or scientific concepts determine political and economic fact. We still tend to base our philosophy of life upon poetic metaphors derived from Plato, the Greeks, and the Hebrews, while the life itself is lived unpoetically according to economic and social necessities, which in a great many cases contradict the philosophy. When

we begin to speculate about life-values, we cannot proceed far without accepting the values already affirmed by the society into which we have come. In the beginnings of thought, poetic and religious explanations, which do not require the rigor of scientific analysis, are much more plausible than any other. Accordingly, having found them satisfactory over a wide area of human experience, socially respectable and advantageous, we find difficulty in replacing them by more empirically derived conceptions. They provide us with a faith, a way of life, and a great poetic image.

These æsthetic and social values are the fundamental reason for the existence and importance of religious myths. We build institutions, rituals, and ceremonies around them, to celebrate the emotional values inherent in the poetic allegories. That emotional quality is lacking in scientific explanation. The difference between the scientific and the poetic description of reality lies in the fact that science insists that its generalizations be concerned with verifiable, unambiguous entities. Consequently, its power to stimulate æsthetic interest is limited. The poetic idea of a friendly deity who is interested in our welfare is an attractive conception for many reasons. It unifies individuals in a common notion of their kinship to the universe, it satisfies a craving for security. The scientific account of a universe with no purpose and no concern for man's welfare is by comparison prosaic, literal, and uncomfortable.

A more striking instance of the contrast between a poetic and a scientific description of reality is the concept of the soul. The soul's essential purity, its freedom from physical decay, its connection with a mysterious other world, make it one of the most attractive poetic myths in literature, religion, and philosophy. When the poet and philosopher conceive it as embodied in a star or meteor, we get a vivid sense of its reality. We can form a living image of an entity flashing through space to spend eternal rest and peace in another world. The progress of the soul through life into the hereafter has an intellectual appeal in its summary of what appears to happen, and is attractive to the imagination. Not so with the psychologist's account of the soul. We are unable to form an exciting poetic image, since the psychologist's explanation tells us first that the soul is not an entity but an activity amongst other activities performed by the human organism. The soul is thereby stripped of its poetic qualities—we cannot form an easy image of its character. We have found no poetic metaphor in science which can adequately symbolize those qualities of human personality which are summarized under the concept "soul." We return again to literal description based upon observation, experiment, and measurement.

In the case of the poetic or religious view of reality there is present a dramatic construction of objects and events. As in the case of other

dramatic constructions, we believe in the reality of the drama while actually enthralled by it. A great many people carry this enthrallment into all phases of their lives. Others believe in the dramatizations of religion only when involved in moral or metaphysical problems. Others believe both the poetic concept and the scientific explanation simultaneously, using one in the context of everyday life, the other for "ultimate" explanations. The ultimate value of religion is poetic. Religion has social and intellectual values as well. But it does not exist as *rational* belief. It is, rather, a poetic way of conceiving the universe.

There is a great variety of poetry about the universe. Sometimes it restricts itself to the elements of the human soul; at other times it goes beyond into the elements of the cosmos itself. Speculative philosophy, in its effort to establish metaphysical principles, constructs poetry of an abstract order. Philosophy, when it attempts to generalize concerning areas of human experience whose explanations are not capable of demonstration, is producing poetry, usually of a kind difficult to understand. The poetic quality lies not so much in the expression, but in the metaphysical conception itself. Such a conception is Bergson's notion of *élan vital*, an attractive poetic metaphor which synthesizes an infinite number of diverse phenomena into one principle. If worship of that force were developed formally, and the poetic metaphor were surrounded by a system of ceremonies and rituals in celebration of its value, there would be a Bergsonian religion. There are potential religious values in all poetry. When poetic metaphor is taken seriously as rational explanation for existence or reality, it provides the elements of religion. Another way of saying this would be to say that there are religious values in poetry.

At this point it is appropriate to distinguish the element in poetry which stimulates the religious experience. In its broadest definition, the element is found to be an interpretation of reality which emphasizes the ultimate mystery and grandeur of our universe. An emotional response to that mystery is frequently evoked by poetry of a certain type and quality. When represented overtly in the dramatic action of a church ceremony, the religious element consists in the personal emotion evoked by the drama. When represented by what might be called a purer form of poetry, that unaccompanied by the stage trappings of ritual, the core of the religious experience is a sense of reverence created by the awareness of cosmic forces greater than man. Yet the beginnings of a rational philosophy are stirring in every religion. We develop maturity in religious belief by the application of philosophical and scientific method.

Suppose that upon analysis, the primitive myth of a god possessing personality, creative power, benevolence, intelligence, and other human attributes, should become refined into a philosophic or scientific concept?

Does the religious value disappear with the refinement of the myth? When we realize that the imaginative concept of religion or of poetry is merely a poetic metaphor evoking certain natural responses, do we then reject the religious element? In general, analysis of this sort does eliminate religious belief. This has often been given as a reason for stifling further philosophical analysis or scientific enquiry. Loss of faith in the divinity of nature through skepticism is a common phenomenon in our modern world.

Science, or naturalistic philosophy, has been the traditional opponent of poetry and religion. Beginning with Bacon's view of poetry as an adornment to speech, and religion as a game for theologians, there has been an intellectual movement in Anglo-Saxon thought away from the notion that poetry and religion have anything intellectually valuable to offer. The further division which Bacon made, that between science and morality, has also had its sponsors in the philosophers and scientists who hold that scientific procedure can do nothing with moral values.

Now that we are living in a world where science is universally trusted as a method of reaching certainty about the phenomena of the physical or spiritual world, our moral, poetic, and religious values are, as Bacon indicated, the preoccupation of a specialized group of sensitive intellectuals who have very little to do with the actual operations of society. The social world is operated by industrialists, scientific technicians, financiers, politicians, and administrators. Philosophers, religious leaders, and poets view these operations sometimes with alarm, sometimes with indignation, occasionally with approval. They construct explanations for what has happened, predict what might happen, comment upon what is happening, and in general provide ornaments of social and intellectual discourse for use by the world in the spare time it can steal from its daily labors.

The greater the body of scientific knowledge we gain about the operations of our natural world, the less rational significance we can honestly give to religious or poetic explanation and imperatives. When we study scientifically the forces at work in society and in human nature, our attention is inevitably focused upon the fact that economic and material motivations are fundamental in social conduct, and that any improvement in morality must begin by an improvement in material conditions for human life. The religious institutions which are strongest in our modern world are those which have developed social programs for amelioration of economic and material evils. By viewing society scientifically as a physical environment for the sustaining of human life, religion loses its theological overtones, yet sustains its spiritual values. The church which is successful in the modern world no longer relies upon a benevolent deity to accomplish its aims. It operates as a social institution. When religion, poetry,

or philosophy turns its attention to the task of renewing the ideals of society, it takes an important step toward making a nobility of spiritual life possible.

The most frequent charge made against the philosophy of the scientist is that it destroys religious values and moral ideals. The charge is justified if by religion and morality we mean the older conception of life and nature based upon the poetic metaphor of a divinity which shapes human and universal ends. But if we conceive our world in natural terms, we find that what we need is a new religion and a new morality, and that science helps us to obtain it. We find that the old explanations are no longer adequate, and that the old prerogatives and obligations of a moral kind are no longer effective.

If the core of religious experience lies in the consciousness of forces in the universe greater than man, the religious experience does not disappear with the extension of science. The element of worship, however, will probably be lacking. The scientist and the naturalistic philosopher do not tend to think in religious terms, although there is reason to suppose that they too enjoy the æsthetic value of what has traditionally been called the religious experience. Even mechanism as a philosophy has its æsthetic side. It is a philosophy founded upon an analogy to the working of the familiar objects of our daily world, and fundamentally is based upon a metaphor taken from the more obvious aspects of the physical world. The sense of mystery and the feeling of reverence tend to disappear along with the need for worship, when we consider the world in terms of its mechanical forces.

The scientist and the philosopher are, however, social animals with one side of the normal life of the individual overdeveloped. Their intellectual abstractions are attempts to impose rational order upon a stubborn universe. Such attempts can never be completely successful. There is a wide area of the inexplicable which refuses to submit to their desire for rational explanation. As in other human beings, they have emotional reactions to such areas, and respond as well or as badly to æsthetic stimulus and poetic values. They are harder to satisfy, since their intellectual discriminations are more predominant than is normal to the individual. In certain extreme cases they may develop, by a radical skepticism, or by a complete positivism, a hardening of the æsthetic arteries. Nothing but proven fact will interest them; the high ambiguity of the best poetry will annoy rather than satisfy them.

These are the unusual cases. Fortunately, it is difficult to avoid completely the æsthetic values of life, no matter what one's dominant interest may be. We are called upon constantly to create in imagination our public world. Our individual estimate of the character of other human beings requires that we react sensitively and imaginatively to the clues which

they provide us concerning themselves. Similarly, no matter from what position we view the universe—as a scientist, a poet, a philosopher—we are compelled to react to the clues it gives us. The scientist may not be concerned with the poetic aspects of reality, but as soon as he leaves the realm of experimental fact to form a world synthesis, he is in territory usually occupied by the poet, the metaphysician, and the religious thinker.

In view of this fact, he may develop religious beliefs which have a scientific basis. Can there be a scientific religion? Not if by religion we mean simply Christianity. Or not if by religion we mean the worship of a spiritual agency responsible for our human presence in this particular universe. Science, if taken seriously, will render irrelevant the God-concept, and render impossible the concept of supernatural morality. What then remains to be religious about? The awareness of the values of life itself, the glory of experiencing, the power of the human mind and will, the faith in the potential development of human living—these are all part of traditional religious values. They remain in our modern scientific world. If the Christian myth is rejected, and Christ is seen in his magnificently human proportions, some of the values formerly considered as religious are recognized as social and æsthetic. Thus the brotherhood of man may remain as a social ideal, although the fatherhood of God will be seen to be an allegorical representation projected into a supernatural realm from a natural human source.

In a philosophy committed to the use of scientific method for knowledge of our world, religion and poetry provide man with two complementary forms of experience. They do not, as has often been asserted, give us deeper truth than science can provide. They furnish emotional and æsthetic experience by their imaginative account of the nature of man and his universe, and, if the accounts be developed convincingly, may influence human behavior and constitute a philosophy of life. To advance philosophically, and socially, religion must learn to discriminate between poetry and rational belief. It may be, if discrimination is severely applied, that the religious element will dissolve into social and æsthetic values.

DOMINANT IDEAS IN THE FORMATION OF ISLAMIC CULTURE[1]

G. LEVI DELLA VIDA

University of Pennsylvania

In a recent article Professor W. F. Albright has maintained that "Islamic civilization is an outgrowth of Hellenism, just as Islam itself is an offshoot of Judæo-Christian religion."[2] Although in some points I differ from him,[3] the correctness of his general statement seems to me unquestionable. May I remark, however, that if we were asked to give a brief description of what Western civilization and Christianity are, an adequate answer might be found in the following sentence: Western Christianity is an outgrowth of Hellenism, just as Christianity itself is an offshoot of the Jewish religion.[4] Since it is obvious that neither Christianity and Islam nor Western and Islamic civilization are identical, Albright's concise definition should be supplemented with some other features if we want to gain an accurate picture of the specific character of Islam.

By Islam we mean, of course, the whole civilization which grew and developed, from the seventh century A.D. to the present day, among the people who followed the religious faith preached by Mohammed. Religion, however, is only one of the manifold aspects of this civilization, and we would like to use a more appropriate term for it, a term which would emphasize its complexity and be as convenient and comprehensive as the term which we use to describe the civilization to which we belong and which belongs to us, namely, "Western civilization." To be sure, we speak also of "Christian civilization," but since many elements in our cultural life lie outside religion, we are glad to have at our disposal the adjective "Western" which is noncommittal and yet well defined. Unfortunately we have no such adjective to fit the general aspect of Islam as a

[1] This article reproduces, with only a few changes in style, a paper read at the centennial meeting of the American Oriental Society, held in Boston in April, 1942, as a part of a symposium on Dominant Ideas in Oriental Cultures (see F. Edgerton, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LXII [1942], pp. 151-156, on India; and D. Bodde, *ibid.*, pp. 293-299, on China). Since the experienced reader will recognize at once what I owe to my predecessors, and what may be the result of independent research and reflection, I have refrained almost entirely from giving bibliographical references.

[2] Islam and the Religions of the Ancient Orient," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LX (1940), pp. 283-301.

[3] Like everything which flows from Albright's pen, his article is so full of original points of view and so stimulating, both in its general outlook and in its details, that an article of at least the same length would be necessary in order to state where one agrees and does not agree with him. Obviously, this would be impossible in the framework of the present discussion but will possibly be done on another occasion.

[4] The fact that Western civilization is more Latin than Greek in its immediate background does not seem to make much difference, because Roman civilization is ultimately an offshoot of Hellenism, even if it has brought in some peculiarities of its own. On the other hand, the Germanic elements which we find in mediæval Europe are not essential.

civilization. To label it "Arabian" would be a gross blunder, historical as well as anthropological; and to use the expression "Near Eastern civilization" would restrict its geographical horizon, while it would unduly expand its chronological limits. We are obliged, therefore, to satisfy ourselves with the term "Islam." If we do not forget that this term implies more than simple religious faith and organization, it may offer the advantage of reminding us that religion was the leading, if not the only, element in the building up of Islamic civilization.

As a matter of fact, Islam, being a highly developed civilization, is so complex that it cannot be made to coincide with anything other than itself. It covers more than religion and more than nation, although both religious and national features are found in it. Not only is Islam the result of a multiplicity of factors, but these factors themselves are composite. Islam arose at the crossroads of several civilizations, all of which were far from primitive and simple. Hellenism, as we saw, is an essential element in Islam. But what is Hellenism? As is well known, it is the form which Greek civilization took after it made contact with the East, modifying many features of Eastern civilization and in turn being modified by it. Judaism and Christianity are two other components of the powerful synthesis which is Islam. They are anything else but "pure" substances, and each appears as the resultant of oriental and hellenistic forces. Incidentally, I do not know of any historical event which may claim absolute "purity." Finally, in maintaining that Islam received and continued the legacy of Hellenism, we are not entirely correct. "Legacy of Byzantium" would be a far better term, for, as everybody knows, the Byzantine civilization carried on Hellenism, although many other elements—most of them Christian, some oriental—came to be added.

"Byzantinized" Hellenism is far from being the only source from which Islamic culture derived its most characteristic features. The influence of Persian civilization on its rise and growth cannot be overemphasized. However, although we know that this influence existed, the loss of the largest part of the evidence from the Sasanian period prevents us from gaining an adequate view of its extension and depth. Furthermore, the same remark which we made about the composite character of the Greek background of Islam applies also to the tremendously complex phenomenon which we call Iranian civilization. It presents at least four distinct periods of development, and each of them not only inherited the character of the preceding one but added some elements from outside, and became each time more vast and elaborate. The early and comparatively "pure" Iranian conquerors of Mesopotamia underwent the impact of the Sumero-Semitic civilization, and after the conquerors were themselves conquered, they were far more receptive to the influence of Hellenism

than is generally assumed. Many aspects of this influence undoubtedly were lost during the nationalistic upheaval of the Sasanian period, but some survived.

A quantitative comparison between two cultures is difficult and misleading; yet we may say that Islam is even more complex than Christianity. Geography and history may explain this, and we should not be led astray by the apparent uniformity of Islam, which exists on the surface only. Beneath it, there lies a stupendous variety of factors, which in only a few cases merged and harmonized into an organic entity; more often they remained as disjointed and antagonistic factors.

The connective tissue which binds together these disparate cells is, indeed, the unity of the religious background. The civilization of the ancient Near East began as a cultural process, which originated with the spreading of the Sumerian civilization over an area much wider than the territory controlled by the Sumerians, and went on as a trend toward political unification, reaching its peak in the establishment of the universal monarchies, Assyrian and Persian. Also in the West, civilization developed along similar lines. Various countries, different in their cultural background but all deeply permeated by Hellenism, were assembled into a single political structure by the Romans, and attained religious unity when Christianity was grafted on the Roman empire. The result was that cultural unity survived the collapse of political unity.

Through the military achievements of Alexander the Great the unity of the Near East broke down, and Hellenism failed to reabsorb entirely its fragments, either politically or culturally. A new unity, and one far wider than the Assyrian and Persian had ever been, would not have been possible (or would have been entirely different) if an obscure dreamer from deep in the Arabian desert had not built up a religion of his own out of some rather undigested pieces of Judaism and Christianity. Without the tremendous impetus which Mohammed gave to the fighting spirit of the Arabs, the military exploits which produced that unity and resulted in the birth of a new civilization could hardly be conceived. Islam, as a cultural phenomenon, never lost the original stamp of religion, and religion was the medium through which language expanded, together with other features intimately connected with language or depending on it: namely, certain stylistic patterns, the tradition of certain well-established literary forms, the vivid recollection of certain historical events, and finally, up to a certain point, the deep-rooted feeling of being one nation. For more than one century, to become a Moslem meant sharing the social status of the Arabian tribes as a legitimate member; for more than three centuries, it meant adopting the Arabic language as the sole expression of one's thoughts and feelings. Perhaps the impact of Arabism on the

new converts may be realized by comparing it with the impact of the English language and cultural tradition on the continental European who has become a citizen of the United States. Later on, when the spreading of Arabic as a language lost its momentum and several national languages and literatures arose, they were all more or less under the influence of Arabic. The men and women who, when speaking or writing, used Persian, Turkish, Hindustani, or Malayan as their mother tongue were always aware that they could not attain a thorough mastery of their own culture unless they learned Arabic and became familiar with Arabic literature. Religion, language, and culture were linked together in Islam to a degree that was equaled only, if ever, by the influence of Latin in mediæval Europe.

Nevertheless, as already remarked, Islam as it developed after the conquests was not identical with the religion preached by Mohammed in a remote corner of Arabia. Spreading far beyond its narrow birthplace, it came into contact with other civilizations of a standard much higher than its own, and was unable to wipe them out. It is not surprising that over the whole Islamic area we find the traces of past ages surviving in popular religion and in folklore. Collecting and identifying these fossils is undoubtedly an interesting study, especially in those areas where several civilizations have piled up on each other, but it is quite unessential to the present discussion.[5] Folklore and popular religion have no age: they belong to the very primitive stock of beliefs and customs of mankind, and go through the long paths of history, from the palæolithic age to the present day, practically unchanged. When we deal with culture, *i.e.*, a self-conscious and organized ensemble of mental activities, the topic is a well-limited and specific one, although it does not cease to be manifold.

The Islam of Mohammed, *i.e.*, the religious and nonreligious experiences and attitudes which are embodied in the Koran, is nothing else than an offspring of Jewish and Christian tradition, plus a certain number of elements belonging to pre-Islamic Arabia—incidentally, pre-Islamic Arabia is anything but a plain and simple concept—and with features, still obscure, taken from the oriental Gnosis. These features also appear, more or less altered, in Manichæism and Mandæism, and we are unable to appreciate them properly for lack of sufficient evidence.[6] As a universalistic religion,

[5] This is the issue on which I most strongly disagree with Albright's view.

[6] The possible influence of Judæo-Christian Gnosis upon Mohammed's religious attitude has been repeatedly expressed by his Western biographers. Valuable contributions towards the solution of this difficult problem have been offered in recent years by J. Pedersen, "The Ṣābians" (*A Volume of Oriental Studies Presented to E. G. Browne,* Cambridge, 1922, pp. 383-391), K. Ahrens, "Muhammed als Religionsstifter" (*Abhandlungen zur Kunde des Morgenlandes,* xix, 4, 1935), and Tor Andrae, "Der Ursprung des Islams und das Christentum" (*Kyrko-historisk Arsskrift,* 1923-1926). Unfortunately, our information about the changes which Jewish and Christian orthodox tradition may have undergone when entering Arabia is extremely scanty, and the direct source from which Mohammed drew his knowledge of the two monotheistic religions upon which he built his own is still undiscovered.

however, Islam is a later product. Its theological system, as well as its cultural and emotional aspect, is chiefly if not entirely due to non-Arab converts; and the leading factors in its development were Christian and Manichæan theology and philosophy, which flowed through Greek, Syriac, and Pehlevi channels. The theology of Islam arose from the embittered polemics against Christianity and Manichæism, and from the fight between traditionalism and modernism. As often happens when two parties are fighting each other, the weaker side may seize the victory by imitating the armament of the better equipped adversary—tanks and planes as well as ideas and methods. In this sort of victory, however, lies a hidden danger: in the end the winner may look too much like the loser. Nevertheless, if Islam escaped the danger of becoming a counterfeit Christianity (actually Christian polemists accused it of being such), this is due in my opinion to the preservation of some features of pre-Islamic Arabia, which survived through the medium of the Koran and the literary tradition. Since these features were barbaric—I would prefer this word to "primitive"—Islam has been unable to get rid of a certain crudity which may be repellent to our "Western" sensitiveness. In the scale of religious values its system is lower than Christianity, although in the intimate and mysterious blossoming of individual religiousness Islam produced some geniuses of unparalleled height.

The "Arabism" in Islam does not end with the presence of national elements in religion. Arabic, as a spoken language, superseded all previous languages from the ridge of the Taurus mountains and the rim of the Iranian highlands to the Atlantic Ocean. As a learned and literary language, it spread widely beyond these borders. Its triumph meant much more than the substitution of one mechanical tool for another; it meant the supremacy, or rather the absolute sovereignty of a clear-cut psychic attitude and pattern of art. The entire Arabic literature has been bound for all time to certain lines which go back to the imagery and rhetorical exuberancy of the seventh-century Bedouins. It always ignored, or was unable to attain, entirely new ways of artistic expression, and the only Islamic literatures which succeeded in developing an original æsthetic sensitiveness were those which could avail themselves of their own linguistic instrument. An epic like the Persian *Shahnameh* could never have been written in Arabic.

Neither hellenistic nor Judæo-Christian nor Iranian influences were essential in Arabic literature.[7] We may see one of the reasons for the

[7] The attempt made many years ago by J. Horowitz, *Spuren griechischer Mimen im Orient* (1905), to find in the Greek *mimos* the source of certain aspects of narrative Arabic literature has remained isolated until a very recent time, when G. E. von Grunebaum brilliantly endeavored to trace back most of the material of the *Arabian Nights* to hellenistic models ("Greek Form Elements in the Arabian Nights," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LXII (1942), pp.

impoverishment and gradual extinction of poetical inspiration in the isolation in which a poetical style fitting the wilderness of the desert found itself in foreign surroundings. In the field of religion servility to the letter of the Koran prevented Islam from absorbing entirely the heterogeneous elements with which it came into contact. The *Leitmotiv* of the religious history of Islam is the desperate attempt to get rid of the rigid literalism of the Koran. Two ways were open to the Moslem believers who were striving towards a higher and less crude form of religion. One was to resort to the weapons supplied by the dialectical methods of Greek philosophy and Christian theology, and to try to give a subtile and sophisticated interpretation of those passages of the Koran which were unsatisfactory to reason and decency. Another way was to delve deeply into mysticism and to find a solution for the odd problems offered by the crudities of the Koran in allegory and intuition. Both rationalism and mysticism were influenced by foreign sources: those of rationalism are obviously Greek. Mysticism, on the other hand, is composite in its elements, and the problem of its origin has not yet been entirely solved. Neoplatonism is probably only one of the sources responsible for the development of Islamic mysticism.[8]

Due to the brilliant research work of Max Meyerhof[9] we know that in the Near East Greek science escaped the almost complete eclipse which it underwent in Greece after the fifth century A.D. In Egypt, in Syria, and in Persia Greek philosophy, medicine, mathematics, and astronomy were taught during the sixth and seventh centuries, and the Arabs were eager to have translated and to study the legacy of Greece. The age of original thinking was over, and what the Arabs inherited from the Greeks was but a dry summary of the teaching of the past, condensed in the form of textbooks, where free discussion and independent research had turned into authoritarian dogmatism. Nevertheless, even in those anemic and mutilated compendiums, something of the Greek spirit survived, and the Arabs took from it some mental habits which they never lost: namely, the ability to discuss problems according to the categories of formal logic, the appreciation of purely theoretical speculation, and above all, the

277-292). Undoubtedly, other late Greek and late Iranian influences affected certain fields of Arabic literature. However, as is stated in the text above, none of them are so essential as to modify its character, which is chiefly based on certain art motifs and style patterns already present in pre-Islamic poetry and prose.

[8] How far Indian speculation may have affected the trend of thought of Moslem mysticism is still an open problem. M. Horten's thesis (*Indische Stroemungen in der islamischen Mystik*, 1927), according to which Sufism is essentially of Indian origin, has not met the approval of the best authorities in this field, in which the present writer must admit that he does not feel entirely at home.

[9] See especially his essay "Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad," *Sitzungsberichten der Berl. Akad. d. Wiss., Phil.-Hist. Cl.*, 1930; and the chapter entitled "Science and Medicine" in *The Legacy of Islam*, edited by Th. Arnold and A. Guillaume (1931), pp. 311-355.

acknowledgment of a "secular" science, fully independent of any religious sectarianism. The contrast between the freedom of critical research and the dogmatism of religious tradition deeply affected the most serious and sincere among the Moslem thinkers, and a painful conflict arose in their mind. The seeds of agnosticism and skepticism were about to produce their fruit, little different from that which appeared in the Christian world some centuries later. And yet the conservative spirit and the impact of bigotry were stronger than any tendency towards liberation. In the third century after the Hijra, Islam underwent its Counter Reformation, and its ability to be original and creative in the field of ideas was definitely cut off.

One of the most amazing features of Islam is the high speed at which its cultural life developed and then stopped. In the first two centuries of its history Islam looks like a wild plant rooted up from its native soil and transplanted into one more fertile. Very quickly it changes into an astonishingly luxuriant growth, but very quickly again it dries up. After the triumph of traditionalism, and because of it, Islam took on its typical aspect which remained unchanged for a whole millennium. It became mediæval, as had Europe three or four centuries before. Islam, however, did not enter the Middle Ages as a consequence of an economic and political catastrophe, as Europe had, but because of a sudden stop in its promising development. To become a great centre of original and constructive progress in culture, to develop the synthesis of hellenistic and oriental tradition, Islam should have renounced its churchly or "denominational" character and parted with its Arabic tradition; in other words, it should have dismissed or forgotten the historical background of its prophet and of its early empire. We cannot presume to know what would have become of Islam if the centrifugal force had been stronger than anything else. Speculation about what has not happened is an idle amusement. At any rate, the record of what did happen tells us that Islam preserved its unity by the sacrifice of its ability to develop as an original and unhampered culture.

This unity, however, by no means meant uniformity. The core of Islamic culture was religious tradition expressed in Arabic, but there was room enough for an extraordinary variety of expression. The history of Islamic culture, in short, is the history of a civilization born of an Arabic and Judæo-Christian background which spread over a number of other civilizations, altering them but superficially and receiving from them more than it gave.

At the peak of its political and economic power, when Bagdad, the capital of an empire extending from Spain to India, maintained trade relations with countries far beyond the boundaries of this empire, Islam was a society even more cosmopolitan than the hellenistic and the Roman

world had ever been. During the third, fourth, and fifth centuries after the Hijra not only the Persian and Greek but also the Indian wisdom appealed to the learned curiosity of the Islamic world and widened its intellectual horizon. The manners and customs of the "barbarians" in Europe and Africa were considered no less worth studying than those of the Turks and the Mongols who were already about to become a leading factor in the political history of Islam. Whereas Europe had to wait for the period after the Renaissance to develop interest in comparative religion and in ethnology, Islam as early as the tenth and eleventh centuries possessed a complete study of all religions and philosophical schools in the work of Ibn Ḥazm, a Spaniard who had studied in the East, and an elaborate monograph on India in the book of Alberuni, a Persian who lived at the court of a Turkish sultan and who devoted an objective and impartial study to all aspects of Indian life. The same Alberuni, perhaps the most "modern" of all Islamic scholars, is responsible for a great work on the chronological systems of all ages and peoples. Even the cosmopolitanism of the hellenistic age—although in this respect it reminds us strongly of Islam—not to speak of the Ancient East or mediæval Europe, produced nothing similar.

From what has already been said, it appears that at least five leading factors are present in the cultural development of Islam: the Arabic background, the religious system, the philosophical and scientific legacy of Greece, the Persian tradition, and finally the cosmopolitan outlook. Each of these factors was in itself the result of a more or less elaborate synthesis. Merging in Islam, they influenced each other with highly complex results.

The Arabic language, after conquering the Islamic world, was modified by the requirements of the new culture. New terms and an entirely new style were created for science and philosophy. This language, however, is the same as that in which the pre-Islamic Bedouins composed their poems or related, in plain prose, the deeds of their warriors.

The religious system developed after the pattern of Christian theology and with the aid of Greek dialectics, which had already helped Christianity to build up its theology. However, the foundation of all theological discussion was still the Koran, which both stimulated and hampered Moslem thought. Greek and Persian tradition, and even cosmopolitanism, were regarded in the light of the Arabic and religious background which the Moslem scholars would have been unable to forget, even had they wanted to.

If these many heterogeneous elements, with their reciprocal give and take, had been integrated by a supreme principle and permeated by a new spirit, Islam would undoubtedly have become the most complete, brilliant, and harmonious of all the cultures which appeared in the ancient world, for none of the others can claim such a wealth and variety of com-

ponents. But such was not the case. One need not be a specialist in Islamic culture to realize that something about it is incomplete and inorganic. Alongside the utmost refinement we find barbaric crudity. Logical soundness and ingenuity are often coupled with an astonishing naïveté and total absence of higher criticism. Thus Moslem scholars were often unable to realize the absurdity of a principle upon which they built elaborate reasoning, formally correct. Some of the fundamental problems of spiritual life were bluntly ignored, in spite of a strong and unselfish trend toward theoretical knowledge. Sophistry and hairsplitting prevailed over independent research and sound criticism.

What is the cause of this striking contradiction? It is hard to explain why Islam never was a leading factor in human progress. It created under the Arabs and the Turks two world-wide empires and spread over three continents, not only by the strength of arms, but chiefly by the influence and prestige of its religion and culture. What shortcomings caused Islamic culture to embody the evil germs of retrogression and deterioration? An answer to this query is extremely difficult. We cannot content ourselves with condemning the inferiority of Islam as a religion or the inadequacy of the oriental race. Old-fashioned theologians and followers of the new racial mysticism may satisfy themselves with such a quick judgment, but historians demand a better explanation.

The present writer does not claim to offer a solution to the problem, but only to present the points of issue. The failure of Islam was chiefly due to the presence of too many contrasting elements, each of which failed to assimilate the others or to merge into a harmonious whole. Islam started as an exasperated monotheism of biblical origin, crude and ferocious, and as fanatic and intolerant as was later the Wahhabi movement or Mormonism in its early days. The religion preached in the Koran fitted well the vigorous but uncultivated minds of the Arabs: its spread by the sword of the early caliphs meant the victory of young barbarity over an oversophisticated civilization. However, the undigested elements of Judæo-Christianity embodied in the Koran reacted to the stimulus of Judaism and Christianity as they existed, in a much more developed form, in Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt. A religion of submission, suppressing the initiative of individuals and oppressing them under an iron law, would not have developed in an atmosphere of political liberty. The Islamic state, however, which had been theocratic in the beginning, soon substituted absolute monarchy, on the pattern of oriental despotism, for the ancient tribal organization of the Arabs, where freedom was rudimentary and unbridled. Later on, it split into a number of minor states under military dictators who, although they paid formal homage to religious law, actually were ruthless in their tyrannical power. Political

abjection and lack of individual freedom have always formed the most favorable soil for religious formalism and intellectual dogmatism. Progress in culture is bound to the free action of the individual and cannot be expected from such an environment. Therefore, neither the impulse of Greek thought nor the byways of mysticism nor the wider outlook of cosmopolitanism was strong enough to awaken a new spirit. They enriched Islam, offering a typical contrast to its general aspect, but were unable to change its essence. A further development of the more progressive elements could only be caused by an impulse from outside. When and how this impulse came and what the reaction of Islam was, and still is, is an entirely new topic, which has been competently dealt with elsewhere.[10]

[10] A Jeffery, "Present-day Movements in Islam," *Moslem World,* XXXIII (1943), pp. 165-186.

A SECOND FRONT FOR SCHOLARS

WILLIAM K. PRENTICE

Princeton University

It is not enough for scholars to go their own way, ignoring what the rest of the world thinks. Too much good intelligence and wearisome labor are wasted, or worse than wasted, labor which might be devoted to the quest of truth. There is too much unnecessary opposition to genuine research. Moreover, knowledge is somewhat like a plant, which gets part of its nourishment from the common soil, and flourishes better when the soil and the climate are favorable. Just so, knowledge has a more natural growth when the general public is enlightened, when old prejudices are discredited, and interest is awakened for investigation and progress.

One of the chief obstacles to a better understanding of the experience of men in the past is the traditional attitude towards much of the ancient literature, which still prevails among many educated and thoughtful people. It is assumed by many that the ancient literature is essentially true as it stands, and that therefore the style, methods, and in general the literary qualities of this literature alone are the proper objects of investigation and discussion. Consequently, with regard to the classical literature in particular, it is sometimes said that to classical scholars all historical problems are literary problems, and that therefore no classical scholar can be a historian. Of course it is equally true that no one who is not, at least to some extent, a classical scholar can be a classical historian, because no one else can interpret the sources for himself. From that it should follow that no one at all can be a classical historian.

There may be some flaw in this conclusion. But certainly many books and articles about classical history, including some very recent ones, show that their authors were still chiefly concerned with how certain ancient writers have written, whether what these writers said is sound and complete or not. For example, there is an attractive and interesting book on Thucydides, published in 1942. This book has been highly praised in recent reviews by classical scholars. Its author writes about Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian war as one would write about a work of fiction, for he discusses the book as a literary production, but does not say much about the validity or the sufficiency of the account which it contains. In a work of fiction the story originated in the mind of its author, and cannot be known to others except through the book itself: the facts which this author imagined are the only facts there are. But that ought not to be the case in a history. Perhaps the author of this new book assumed that, because of the exceptional excellence of Thucydides

as an observer and a historian, his account of situations and events represents accurately all the actual situations and events, and that Thucydides' deductions and conclusions are the only ones which anyone, at least nowadays, can properly draw. But this is not true of any other historical work. A history must always be the presentation of its author's *opinions* that such and such things really happened in the ways which he describes, and of his *understanding* of what he believes to have been the facts, and of the *conclusions* which he draws as an individual. Any objective discussion of this matter, except of course among specialists, is hindered by the belief of many that a person who doubts the accuracy of the judgment of a great classsical author like Thucydides is a damnable heretic and blasphemer, or at best what people call a hypercritic.

In studies which involve the Bible in any way, the progress of scholarship is impeded by the intrenched belief that the Bible, as it stands, is a supernatural revelation. For example, there is Karl Adam's *The Spirit of Catholicism,* written originally in 1923. This is a sincere and very pious book. It contains a good deal of argument, all involving the assumption that the Bible—the Old Testament as well as the New Testament—is true as it stands, and that every passage in it was written, under divine inspiration, by the person to whom it is assigned. Or, very recently, an essay was written by a mature and very earnest man about Obadiah, which seeks to show that when this prophet speaks of Edom he does not mean *Edom:* he means *natural man,* who will sometime be overcome by *spiritual man.* That is, the book of Obadiah, being in the Bible, must be true; but it is not true about the historical Edom. Therefore it must be true about some metaphorical Edom. That the book of Obadiah can be understood easily if it is recognized as a human document does not seem to have occurred to this essayist.

Those of us who are concerned with the history of times and peoples about which there is little, if any, extant literature do not always appreciate how fortunate they are. They depend on excavations and archæological discoveries, and on documents which had an immediate and generally practical purpose, without any intention of influencing posterity. These happy scholars have not much to do with a scripture commonly believed to be inerrant and authoritative. The difficulties with which other scholars have to contend is illustrated by the work of some modern classical archæologists and historians who, when they have to depend on monuments alone, have commonly reached conclusions which are at least plausible if not always convincing, but, when they have besides the monuments a literature and a tradition—Homer, for example—which they do not evaluate correctly, are often confused and misled even in their interpretation of the monuments themselves.

There are other, and still more important hindrances to the understanding of ancient times:

(a) Most people are reluctant to believe that anything in an ancient book was not always there. In 1938 a paper was published in the *Jahreshefte des Oesterreichischen Archaeologischen Instituts,* Vol. XXXI, on the tradition that Thucydides the historian was a son of a certain Olorus, and belonged to the family of Cimon. The paper argued that this tradition is false, and that the passage (iv, 104, 4), in which Thucydides seems to refer to himself as the son of Olorus, is a gloss. There are good reasons for thinking so: the best is that evidently these words were not in the text known to those who contributed to the so-called Marcellinus biography of Thucydides in the fifth or sixth century after Christ. Still, many have said, and will continue to say: "Why, Thucydides himself says that he was Olorus' son; you cannot go behind that." Such persons feel themselves bound by what may have been noted on the margin of his copy by some ancient but unknown reader, though it is contrary to the evidence available now.

(b) Many find it hard to believe that any ancient book was not written by the person in whose name it was composed, or whose name has somehow been attached to it. But it is well known now that in ancient times many books were published in the name of someone other than the actual author. One does not need to think of examples as extreme as the *Letters of Phalaris,* which were a common schoolbook until Bentley proved them spurious. No one now supposes that Plato's dialogues are records of actual conversations between Socrates and his friends. Many parts of our Bible were written in the name of someone else. But the date and authorship of a book affect most seriously our interpretation of it, and the use we make of it. How important it would be for the knowledge of the development of the Christian church if it were recognized that the "Epistles of Paul to Timothy" were written long after the death of St. Paul! Yet few but the most unprejudiced of scholars, when they read: "Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ . . . unto Timothy, my own son in the faith," can resist the conviction that these words settle the question of date and authorship.

(c) Lastly, the study of ancient history is very much hindered by the common belief that the ancient writers knew a great deal more, at least about their own times, than we can know, and that their statements are more to be relied upon than modern opinions based on deductions and argument. For example, a critic of a recent book on *The Ancient Greeks,* in a review last summer, speaking of the author's discussion of Pericles, said: "But Thucydides thinks otherwise, and he had a better chance to judge of Pericles than Professor Prentice." Of course he did. But is it

really evident that the opinions which Thucydides expressed about Pericles are more reliable than the opinions expressed about our President by some of the highest officials in our present government?

Now doubtless many who read this article will be thinking, "We know all that." Undoubtedly we know it. But many of us are not doing much about it. What can we do? It's an old saying, *"Gegen die Dummheit kämpfen die Götter selbst vergebens."* Prejudice is a still more dangerous obstacle to truth than stupidity. The attempt to overcome prejudice is often hopeless: the truth, we say, will ultimately prevail. Doubtless it will; but it may take a long time, and the need is pressing. Personally I believe that in large measure the present war is due to the distortion of the simple teaching of Jesus because of ignorance or bigotry. I believe that many arguments for current political, economic, or social theories are falsely based upon the history of the past because that history has been continually misinterpreted and misapplied.

Scholars themselves are not free from the effects which unsound premises, illogical reasoning, false knowledge, and prejudice have upon the average people of our time and environment. Like everybody else scholars sometimes believe too easily what they hear, or read, or what they have always supposed to be true. Most of them are at least in some degree affected by current beliefs and opinions, and in some degree share the common prejudices. Probably there is no one who does not have some feeling of *Pietät* towards long-accepted traditions. Such influences obstruct and often vitiate everyone's thinking.

Of course something is being done to influence general beliefs. Such books as Barton's *Archæology and the Bible*, Enslin's *Christian Beginnings*, Albright's *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, are making an impression on the intelligent public. Recently a friend of mine, who makes his living by his pen, asked me how Galilean peasants could write books of the New Testament in Greek. I told him, and I lent him Professor Enslin's book. When he returned the book, he said: "I've read it three times. I can't imagine how I could have failed to think of that solution."

In a certain sense knowledge begets knowledge. I mean that knowledge, wherever and however it is expressed, commonly does lead on to more knowledge, and the knowledge acquired by scholars does ultimately spread, wider and wider, to the rest of the world. But I think that more effort should be made to refute the false premises and postulates on which many of our traditions and common beliefs are based. I think it is very important that professional scholars should write more books addressed to the general public as well as to scholars, and should publish their knowledge and ideas more often in periodicals which are not distinctly professional.

THIS WAS A PREACHER

EUGENE M. AUSTIN

Tioga Baptist Church, Philadelphia

DURING the summer months of 1905 the pulpit of the First Baptist Church of Philadelphia was filled by a young man from New Haven, Connecticut. It was a comfortable era, that first decade of the twentieth century. Prices were low and profits were fat. The trust busters were still little more than an ominous cloud upon the horizon. The novelists had not yet begun to explore the seamy side of the American scene. Life was good to the folk who attended First Church; and if pew rents came high, the rates were justified. The official board prided itself in its capacity to find and secure the best preachers on the Eastern seaboard. They had just hired a young organist named Frederick Maxson who was the envy of the saints at Holy Trinity; and he had at his disposal a quartette of opera singers who could outshout the full organ when they turned loose on *The Messiah*. The children of the Sunday school enjoyed an annual picnic in chartered open-air cars to Willow Grove at the expense of the Sunday-school superintendent, Senator Tustin. The growing boys, coming into the Boy's Guild, were taught that God was a kindly patriarch, very much like dear old Major Groff, with his flowing whiskers and Prince Albert coat, standing between the tasseled portieres at the top of the plush-carpeted stairway, with one hand resting, gently but firmly, on the spire of the First Baptist Church, and the other hand on the Corn Exchange National Bank.

Into this haven of bliss came George Hooper Ferris, to nourish the saints while Dr. Tupper rested. He was scheduled to preach for nine consecutive Sundays, thanks to the generosity of the Calvary Church of New Haven, which had granted him leave of absence for the summer. But before three weeks had passed, a wave of interest had swept through the congregation. Who was this young man, and what was he saying? Through the years of Dr. Kerr Boyce Tupper's ministry the congregation had adjusted its habits of thinking to the mind of its preacher, learning gradually to solve its typical religious and social problems in a typical way, getting its thinking into well-accustomed grooves. But on those summer Sundays, and under the spell of this new voice, the old, accustomed truths became strangely new; and the people were profoundly stirred.

So it was no mere happenstance that when Dr. Tupper resigned in September to accept the call of the fashionable Fifth Avenue Baptist Church of New York City, the people of First Church recognized the visit of the young man from New Haven as an act of Providence, not lightly

to be ignored. In late October they extended the call, which Ferris accepted a month later.

As I read through the correspondence between the pulpit committee and Dr. Ferris, I sensed between the lines a kind of solemnity, decency, good order that impressed me. I found myself asking the question: What ails our generation that we take these matters so lightly? I venture to predict that the next time there is a vacancy in the pastorate at First Church, when the choice is made, the candidate will be notified by telegram and will wire back the next day, "CALL ACCEPTED AND TERMS SATISFACTORY STOP WILL ARRIVE DECEMBER FIRST." But listen to a portion of Dr. Ferris' letter, written only after thirty days of solemn deliberation:

> To respect the independent workings of your minds, and to ask the same charity for my own thought, is my promise and desire. To conceal no difficulty, shelter no friction, shrink from no task, but encourage a simple and reverential trust in all that God gives us of truth and duty, is my aim. I shall give to you all the earnestness of my faith, and all the devotion of my powers, promising to serve, not your will and desire, but your highest hopes, your deepest aspirations, your tenderest loves, your conscience and sympathy and grief, and all those motives and impulses which interpret for us the will of Him who alone is our Master and Lord.

Here, then, was a Westerner of thirty-eight, at the zenith of his powers, about to enter upon the work of preacher to one of the oldest and most widely recognized Baptist congregations on the Middle Atlantic seaboard. Within the next five years he was to deliver addresses before the Baptist Congress and the Northern Baptist Convention and the students of Brown, the University of Chicago, and many other schools and colleges. He was destined to become known throughout the East as a daring prophet of that new religion which had grown out of soil fertilized by the rotting corpses of old orthodoxy and superstition, watered by the kindly rain of modern mysticism, and nurtured by the sun of an all-knowing creed called "science." He was the incarnation of the mind of Western Europe and America when the twentieth century was young. Since then, a bright hope has been blasted and betrayed, and the enlightened spirit of those kindly days has been clouded over by other irreconcilable facts. The preacher of the '40's does not speak with such reckless assurance about such a number of things as did the preacher then; he lives too close to death and cruelty and the *Weltschmerz* in his own soul. This is the age of the uncertain trumpet; that was the age of the pulpit giant. And when George Hooper Ferris spoke from his pulpit, with his great body tensed and his face lighted up by the idea within him, the respectable citizens forgot their dinners, the students in the galleries crouched forward with their faces transfixed, and City Hall shook.

Not only City Hall, but the Philadelphia preachers! Who was this latest heir to the pulpit that constituted the typical ministerial success dream? Like many another pulpiteer of his time, Ferris had made his own way. Born into a home already bursting with boys, out in a prairie community in Lamartine Township, Wisconsin, he had had to learn the hard way what the thorns and thistles were that grew up among the good seed; and his preaching never outgrew the agricultural figures that make the New Testament the common property of farmers in Palestine and Wisconsin. His father ran the local grocery store, served out a term in the State Assembly in 1887, and succeeded in passing on to the boys a solid, sturdy moral code and a vast capacity for laughter. George must have derived from his mother his tenderness, his sensitiveness to human joy and sorrow. It is indicative of the hold she had upon him that a month after he had entered Wayland Academy he walked twenty-five miles back home to see her!

To Wayland Academy he went; then by hook or crook to Brown; and on to Union. After an agonizing decision not to go to Germany for further study, he preached at Tarrytown for a while; had a brilliant pastorate at New Haven (regarding which William Lyon Phelps wrote him later, "As I look back to the days when I heard you preach I remember you always as one whose admirations were always well developed"); and then to Philadelphia.

I would like to go on with these biographical reminiscences; but I am not sure of the line where biography ends and hagiography begins. It would be of interest to discuss his friendly theological controversies with that astute physician and churchman, Dr. W. W. Keen. Another paper could be written about his courageous activity in aiding to uncover the charity racket in the city, or about his discussion with Dr. Vedder over matters of the early church, or about his ten-yearlong running battle with the entrenched orthodoxy of Philadelphia and his own church. But to place the emphasis upon matters such as these would be to miss the man altogether. For altogether and through and through, George Hooper Ferris was a preacher; and to his sermons we must go directly.

One evening last winter, as I was reading casually the review of a book of sermons in a religious journal, I was startled into awareness by a question raised by the reviewer. "What makes a good sermon?" he asked; and went on to confess that he, for one, hadn't the faintest idea. He went on to say that most good sermons that he had heard or read contained a modicum of horse sense and a feeling for the problems that bothered people; and he intimated that those simple standards were rigorous enough to rub out most of the time he had spent in the pew. When I thought about it, I wanted to stand up somewhere and challenge his words; for

they seemed to me to dismiss too lightly a vocation to which many a man has devoted a lifetime. My firm conviction is that a sermon is a literary form that is as exacting, and subject to as rigorous literary standards, as any other form of rational human expression. Music, drama, poetry, painting, the dance—all of these are spontaneous outgrowths of the human spirit, arising out of the primordial urge of the human soul to grasp a moment of time or a fugitive idea, and make of it a thing of beauty and a joy forever. Now preaching, as I see it, belongs within this category of the arts; and the preacher must be governed and guided by this concept of his vocation. There are norms by which he must examine the validity of his creative idea, standards which govern the process of composition, and rules by which to criticize his finished performance. Conceived in this manner, the pitfalls of preaching are manifold and disastrous. Some preachers never have ideas of their own. Some preachers conceive exciting, dynamic ideas; but have never disciplined themselves to learn the process of creative composition. They are like Tschaikowsky, who missed the greatness of Beethoven and Brahms because he persisted in climbing on the back of a theme and riding it until it had gasped out its last breath of life! Still other preachers are creative thinkers and intelligent, industrious craftsmen. They choose their theme wisely and develop it with continuity and integrity; bring out all of its manifold and fascinating counterthemes; and at the last, unite the whole with the authority of a completed idea. But when they are called upon to perform the finished work, they are weak, hesitant, and ineffective. Verily, the art of preaching is a terrifying thing to those who take it seriously! The preacher must be creative thinker, composer, and performer, all in one. Is there any other vocation that demands this of a man? A jealous pedant pointed his accusing finger at Brahms and said, "You stole that theme from Grieg!" But Brahms laughed at him in derision. "Of course!" he said. "Any fool knows that. Look what I did with it!" Otis Skinner was not required to have written the lines of Shylock; Shakespeare was never forced to perform them. Toscanini feels no shame in conducting a symphony that is not his composition; Shostakovitch is not expected to conduct. Mendelssohn writes, Menuhin plays. But the preacher must be able to conceive an idea, develop it into a finished composition, and perform it—twice a week! In view of these facts, I have often wondered if a new era of honesty and pulpit power would not await the preacher who had the audacity on occasion to announce to his people at sermontime that, since the wellsprings of his own spirit had temporarily been pumped dry, he would favor them with a sermon entitled "Deep Calleth unto Deep," by Phillips Brooks, which was given its first performance by the composer in Boston in 1888!

It is no wonder, then, that only five or six great preachers appear in any generation. These are the men who, like Keats' "new planets" that are hailed by "watchers of the skies," make all other luminaries pale. These are they who successfully unite these functions: finding the new ideas for which each generation seeks, building upon these truths with intelligence and skill, and then communicating them to waiting men with persuasive power.

To place Ferris upon this lofty Parnassus is to claim an acquaintance with the preaching of his generation which I do not have. But before we examine his merits, I should like to suggest one quality of artistic greatness which unquestionably he had. He was always, to the end, dissatisfied with himself as preacher. Sunday after Sunday, with the service over and the people gone, he could be found in his study with the manuscript of the sermon just preached—for in the pulpit he used only a half-dozen suggestive words on a card—marking up the manuscript and hacking it apart. At last he would put it away after mumbling, "Next time I preach this sermon, I'll preach it better!" One day he turned to Deacon Samuel Clevenger and said, "If they make a mistake and send me to heaven when I die, I hope they'll give me a congregation to preach to!"

Let us accept it, then, that a preacher is to be judged by these three standards, or *at least* these three—his basic ideas, the way he works them out, and the effectiveness with which he transmits them.

Concerning the first of these standards, let me risk the assertion that every great preacher is known by the one compelling idea that permeates his preaching. Is there any sounder prescription for preaching power? Get hold of one idea! Be sure in your heart that it is true. Be sure that you can state it simply; for if it cannot be stated simply, it is not true. Be sure that it is big enough to cast light on the dilemmas and heartaches of the people to whom you minister. Then go out and preach it! Savonarola preached the idea of a God-governed society. Luther preached salvation by faith. John Wesley preached Christ's redemptive sacrifice. Fosdick preaches the sacredness of human personality. Stewart of Scotland preaches the saving power of the living Lord. Whether they start with Jacob or Job, whether they begin with the problem of human suffering or the international situation—before they are done, they are back to some aspect of the one compelling idea that they preach.

At First Church from 1905 to 1917 the one great idea that went forth from the pulpit was *the ultimate triumph of truth.* Listen to this from a sermon preached in 1911:

> Out of the night of superstition and savagery the human race has gone marching on into the light, and every step of the way has been marked by the broken chains and shackles flung off by the mind.

Or this, from a Christmas sermon the same year:

> What though the ages move slowly! What though frosts of cynicism and doubt retard the life that is struggling into tender beauty! The outcome is certain. Wild forces of wickedness may reign for a time. Cruelty and intolerance may hinder the longed-for summer of belief. I cannot despair. I know that the brightness of His love will yet conquer the cold, and scatter the forces that now render desolate the lands of earth. . . .

In short, we have here optimistic liberalism in its pristine innocence, we say; and we smile. It is the theology which had its scientific roots in Spencer and Huxley, which looked with suspicion upon the pragmatists up at Harvard, and had not yet heard of Turgenev and Dostoievsky. It is the Christianity which had assimilated the problem of textual criticism as applied to the Old Testament, the Christianity which had assimilated Harnack's Christology of world-brotherhood-by-gradualism, but which had not yet felt the full impact of Schweitzer and the eschatologists. We know so much more now!

But what is the nature of this truth whose ultimate triumph Ferris preached? Certainly it was not the fleeting goal-at-the-end-of-the-long-journey-upward of Darwinism. Ferris, like all the intellectuals of his generation, was dominated by the concept of human progress. "The origin of life," he said, "is an interesting question, but the destiny of life is far more important. Where we started on this long journey, at a lemur, or a gastrula, or a grain of sea silt, is a question to be decided by the investigations of the biologist. Whither we are going, what glories await us . . . is a hope that we can get only through the vision of a prophet." And it is that latter note that is the key to his concept of truth. The doctrine of evolution is right so far as it goes, he thinks—and he had the courage to say so in 1909—but it will be understood only by those who look to the future of the evolutionary process and not to the past, and who look for its meaning as well as its operation. And both of these, he insists, take us over into an area of value judgments that have to do with faith. Every fact of science, put into the hands of a thoughtful man, must lead him at once to reflect upon the problems of the human spirit.

The truth, then, that Ferris preached was that whole body of reflective faith that is the heritage of the Christian mind. To be sure, he lived in a generation whose scientific outlook we are inclined to disparage. But the significant fact is this—that while Ferris' knowledge of the facts of the science of *his* time would put to shame the knowledge that most of *us*

have of the science of *our* time, nevertheless he was its critic and not its puppet. He never relaxed in his one-man crusade against a narrowly naturalistic interpretation of life. His truth was the truth of the poet. Listen to him again:

> I would rather be a child, and imagine the milk wagon was the chariot of a conqueror each morning than be an astronomer and see nothing but sines and cosines in the stars. . . . We live under the tyranny of fact. . . . Not that I would utter my voice for one moment in favor of falsehood—I want the truth. I want that truth that can be heard only in poetry. I want that truth that belongs to the child. . . . I want that truth which hears an echo behind the voice of the wind, and sees a mystic message of purity in the flowers. Let us away with the conception that we must turn everything around between the thumb and finger before we can say we "know."

And when he said things like that, some of his flock called him a "mystic." That was a strange fact that disturbed him no little. When he challenged narrow authority and unresponsive orthodoxy, they called him a "rationalist." When he challenged the creed of naturalism, they called him a "mystic." Why in the world didn't they make up their minds? For the fact was, so nearly as he allowed himself to be put in any metaphysical pigeonhole, he chose to be called a "rational mystic." Truth, for him, was revealed directly to the man who lived and lived hard. He had no liking for sickly living or for the kind of temperament that was constantly feeling its pulse. Life was truth and truth was life. And for Ferris, religious truth was life lived hard and well, with moral vigor, with sensitiveness to misfortune and need; and the answer to religious doubt was down the highway of activity and service. Here was the one impelling idea that permeated every minute of his preaching—the triumph of truth, lived out in the lives of good men.

But it is not enough to have a solid, impelling idea: the preacher must know how to work it out. And this is no simple procedure in which anyone "with a modicum of horse sense and a feeling for the problems of people" will necessarily succeed. Don Quixote was motivated by a real and basic idea which his generation needed to understand; but he did not know what to do with it; and his story has become a classic of frustration against a backdrop of braying asses and flying windmills.

Not so George Ferris! By the time he was installed at First Church he had mastered his techniques. They were his own; they bore the stamp of his own particular temperament and preparation. His printed sermons are different in quality and in literary form from any other sermons I have read; and yet they have enough internal similarity and integrity to give abundant evidence of having been fired at a common forge. To be sure, his literary style has been influenced by the Victorian literature in which he was steeped. In his eloquent flights, he takes on the rotundity of a

Carlyle; whereas when he drives home his point, he becomes as terse as Coleridge. But this is the point: Despite whatever literary influences his sermons show, George Ferris knew where he was going in his preaching. He had his great and dominant idea; but he also knew how to get on with it. Let me illustrate this point by a brief analysis of his preaching method.

All of the fifty-four printed and manuscript sermons which I have examined can be classified roughly into four groups. There is the sermon, first, in which he takes two contrasting ideas and plays upon them. I take as an example of this type of sermon one entitled "The Broad Mind and the Narrow Way." In this sermon Ferris holds up for contrast two apparently conflicting statements of Jesus—"He that is not against me is for me," and "He that is not for me is against me." With careful attention to the context and the historical circumstances under which these words were spoken, he shows that in one situation Jesus was pleading for tolerance and understanding regarding matters of intellectual and theological belief, while in the other situation Jesus was pleading for uncompromising moral rectitude. Hence for the Christian: the "broad mind" and the "narrow way." Each of these contrasting conceptions is examined underneath and on top, with a minuteness of scrutiny and richness of illustration that bring joy to the heart of any preacher who reads the sermon.

His second technique, used by every pulpiteer (and fumbled by most), is the life situation that arises out of the Bible story. Certainly, there is no preaching device that is more familiar and hackneyed. For generation after generation the preachers have ransacked their Bibles for homiletical material, until it would seem that every novel interpretation of the old Bible stories must have been ferreted out long since. And still we persist in doing it. Why? Is it not because we are hounded by the realization that there is a compelling persuasiveness in them that makes our bombast puny? And is it not also because we know that every great preacher handles them with power? In the hands of a Ferris, those men who came from James to tie the hands of Peter and Paul in their work at Antioch brought with them a kind of conservatism that is not conservatism but dry rot. In his hands, Peter, standing there at the door of the judgment hall where Jesus was on trial, undecided whether to go in or stay out, is Everyman, who must make up his mind, come to decisions, or perish amid the misty flats of neutrality. Here are greatness and pulpit power. I have heard men who sat in the gallery on Sunday evening, January 19, 1908, thrill once again, thirty-five years later, over the sermon that was preached that night. It was "The Staff of Elisha," with its picture of that stupid little busybody Gehazi, who thought he could do anything

Elisha could do, so long as he had Elisha's staff. But it was not the word picture that held them. It was the warning against putting one's trust in symbols and tradition, and thus betraying life and vital faith. It is an interesting commentary on preaching methods, that these biblical sermons have been remembered most clearly by those whom I have questioned about his preaching.

Some of the sermons are definitely topical, and are treatments of matters that were of contemporary interest. They are most interesting to the historian, for they are attune to the *Geistzeit* of the first and second decade of the twentieth century. "Christianity and Socialism," preached when socialism was a parlor theory and not a movement that was sweeping the world under half-a-dozen names; "Evolution and Religion," preached in recognition of the Darwinian centenary in 1909; "Modern Mysticism," a critique of the new psychology and favorably disposed to it; "Charity," a plea for organized and trained social work to take the place of the well-intentioned but unintelligent charity of his time—What would Ferris think of it if he could see it full-flowered in the Beveridge Report? So they go. I pass them without comment, except to say that they reveal a preacher who was aware of his responsibility to interpret the movements of his world, and who was never content to bring them to the attention of his people without challenging them. Whatever he discussed, he brought it to focus against the truth that he preached. Evolution, socialism, the new psychology, pragmatism—did they aid or hinder the ongoing march of truth.

But the technique Dr. Ferris used most frequently and most effectively—in this critic's judgment, at least—was the development of a single suggestive idea. He would stride into the pulpit, state his thesis in a few efficient words; and then proceed to examine it above, below, and through. His illustrations were truly illustrative; they were not used to pad and consume time. As he went on, the idea, first stated in its simplest terms, was turned about, put into reverse; then the whole matter was brought up to a higher level; and with the discussion the idea grew. Is there any craft more fascinating, any task more challenging, than that of the preacher? During the winter of 1910-1911 Ferris was at the height of his power. That was the year in which he undertook a detailed study of the spiritual life upon the basis of Mark 12:30: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." There were five sermons in the series: "The Affectional Element of Spirituality," "The Devotional Element," "The Intellectual Element," "The Moral Element," and finally, "A Complete Spirituality." Each of the sermons is a masterpiece of rigorous thinking and persuasive argument; and yet the entire series is a unit, each

part of which is only one side of a many-faceted truth. It is one of the few examples I have seen of really effective series preaching.

To sum up: We have been examining this preacher upon the basis of two criteria—the power and validity of his central idea and the practical skill with which he handled his methods of composition. There remains to discuss the third criterion—the effectiveness of his public performance. John Oman tells the story of an old Scottish professor who used to say that there were three qualities for the ministry—the grace of God, knowledge of the Scriptures in the sacred tongues, and gumption. The first, he said, we have the promise of if we pray for it; the second we can have if we work for it; but if the last is not the gift of nature, he did not know that either prayer or labor could provide it! Certainly, here was a preacher whom nature had provided with gumption! How he stirred his congregation, however, and with what techniques he worked upon the platform, I am powerless to speak. I never heard him preach. But there are men—some of them preachers and many of them laymen—all of them past fifty, in whose memory the figure of Ferris is a vital, throbbing reality today. And it is at exactly this point that the critic who handles his written sermons must recognize the distinct limitations of a literary criticism of a preacher. They say that his preaching sparkled with great-hearted laughter. I do not find it in his written sermons! One eminent Philadelphian, whose student days at the University included many a trip down to First Church on Sunday nights, told me once that to listen to Ferris' preaching was like standing at the prow of a ship that is heading out from land into uncharted oceans. For the life of me, I do not find it in the manuscripts! I have tried to read them aloud, and they do not read well. And I am forced to concede, even against my better literary convictions, that the printed page is not the preacher. Over and beyond the finished sermon there was the man. But lest this truism provide aid and sanctuary for the lazy preacher among us who rests his preaching laurels upon a well-modulated voice and a vast capacity for tender, comforting thoughts, let it be said that behind the man, with all his personal power and fire, there is the finished sermon, written word for word, and sweated out of his hide, Friday after Friday, year after year.

To be sure, he paid the price, and counted it not too dear. He died at fifty, insatiate of life to the very end. I lay aside his sermons now, only to find myself asking more questions than I have answered. What would Ferris have said about some of the questions that concern the preachers now? Where would he have stood on the church's attitude toward war? What would he have said about totalitarian government, by whatever name it is called? How would he have faced the rising tide of secularism that has emptied the churches and thrust them off the crowded highway of

contemporary history? Questions like these, of course, are idle. He was a preacher to his own age, not ours. But this we can say: He believed in the future with a passionate conviction that our generation will surrender at its peril. Toward the end of his ministry there came a week after Easter when, dissatisfied with his Easter sermon, he was drawn to make another statement as to the hope and promise of the Christian faith. The manuscript of the sermon for that Sunday after Easter never reached the printer. At the conclusion of it he tells of an interview with a social worker with whom he was discussing an almost hopeless tangle. At one point in the discussion the social worker threw up his hands and exclaimed, "It seems as if we needed a few million years." To this Dr. Ferris adds, "I could not refrain from whispering to him, 'What a splendid thing it is that we have more than that!' "

IN DEFENSE OF THE OTHERWORLDLY

JOHN WOOLMAN BRUSH

Andover Newton Theological School

"THE EARTH is a little dust that clings to our travelling feet," sings Alfred Noyes in his poem, "The Old Skeptic." But we hardly need to quote the noncanonical writers, when the Bible from first to last is full of the pilgrim spirit which sets slight value on the tangible treasures of life on earth. As to whether the Bible is predominantly otherworldly or not we may have later to consider briefly. That a telling strain, however, in its total symphony is otherworldly cannot be gainsaid. "Here we have no continuing city, but we seek one to come."

By otherworldliness we mean the temper or spirit that holds that "the greater and the better part of life is out of sight." Earth's quarrels and sufferings and tragedies do not loom too large when one can contemplate the everlasting treasure in store for the faithful in heaven. The otherworldly man cultivates, or is endowed with, a certain scorn for the goods which the worldly man seems so highly to evaluate, such as money, and the power it represents and the security it is supposed to guarantee. He is not wedded to the pursuit of personal prestige, name, and fame; nor is he concerned to achieve the highest social acceptance. Even when he considers himself a trustee or steward for the treasures that have fallen to his lot, he has learned to hold them with a relaxed hand, constantly aware that to surrender them may be demanded of him, and that such a surrender may be quite necessary in the writing out of his personal equation.

To be sure, there are intensely this-worldly men who care nothing at all for personal wealth or even apparently for fame or glory. Some of the totalitarian political leaders are otherworldly in this sense, achieving a certain admirable disinterestedness. Yet largely disbelieving in the God of theistic religion, and either opposed or agnostic to a Christian conception of a heaven of fulfillment and fellowship and understanding, they are hardly to be called otherworldly unless one intends by the term the quality of devotion to certain political consummations or social ends. Possibly here lies the most significant sublimation of otherworldliness in history, in this large commitment on the part of many Marxists, nationalists, social workers, and civic servants, in the direction of certain social, national, or international ends. With the Christian heaven a blank to them, they pour the passion of their devotion into the quest of earthly utopias. Whatever from our Christian point of view the errors of their ends or means, we are compelled to pay passing tribute to their ethical

and humanitarian zeal. God is surely beckoning them to find their souls by losing them. They are not, however, the examples we are commending as Christian in this discussion of the otherworldly spirit, for they have not been laid hold upon by the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

We are thinking of the Christians who consciously and devoutly believe in life with God beyond the point of death, and who order their lives with more or less consistency and zeal to this goal. They are not only capable of great renunciations of place and power and wealth, but they welcome the challenge to such renunciations. The type seldom comes pure. We are in the realm here, moreover, of great possibilities of contradiction and of confusing crosscurrents. Many a rich and close-sheltered widow on Fifth Avenue achieves a kind of otherworldly phase. Here in our possession is a book of original anthems by the organist of a very wealthy New York church of about sixty years ago. The words, largely from more or less familiar hymns, are almost oppressively otherworldly. Church devotions can run intensely toward heaven while church trustees are playing a shrewd game on the stock market. Given the possibility of heaven after death, perhaps the average Christian will arrive at a working philosophy that makes the best of both worlds, with or without the tension described for us by Troeltsch and Von Hügel. Of Augustine we often say that he was the comprehensive genius who worked out the *modus vivendi* between this-worldliness and otherworldliness. But as Christian history proceeds, and the *modus vivendi* is taken a little too easily for granted, we are glad for men like the Spiritual Franciscans who see that there is a balance to right on God's side and the soul's side. Our definition of the true otherworldly man looks to positive renunciations on this planet in the contemplation of the eternal goal and its precious and incorruptible wealth.

Yes, the type seldom comes pure. It seems at times almost mythical. But every Christian pastor has found fair examples among the humbler members of his congregation, tithers, like as not, careless of styles in dress, indifferent to social prestige for themselves or their offspring, deeply devoted to their children as immortable souls, and ready for any exacting or humiliating task up to the limit of their strength. Such words as we use may represent a composite. But even the composite helps our assurance that the otherworldly type endures. Furthermore, let us venture to say that we need persons of such simplicity and detachment now more than ever. If ever the world were too much with us, it is now. The commonest word used by the Christian philosophers to designate the curse of the church today is secularism. Otherworldliness may serve as the precise opposite and corrective of secularism.

The first-century Christians were certainly otherworldly. Their citi-

zenship was in heaven. Opposition and martyrdoms confirmed their conviction that this world and its rulers were of a condemned order of things and that their own lot as Christians was to be eternally blessed. The renunciations implicit in the pentecostal communism of Acts is true to the spirit of otherworldliness, as is the zeal of the preaching of Peter and Paul, passionately desirous of leading men out of the doom of mortality into eternal union with the glorified Christ. Barred by many factors, internal and external, from normal participation in the life of the empire, the early Christians found their compensation in their hope.

The apocalyptic quality of this hope, it is true, tended of necessity to give a Jewish this-worldly temper in a sense which we must carefully define. It was to be apparently with a body of some sort and on a tangible earth that the Christian was to enjoy the glorious future when his Saviour should return from the skies. The explicit eschatology of the first two centuries is not yet hellenized, though one is confused in trying to harmonize the hints of the New Testament in this regard. In Origen we see one who would dismiss the materialism from the Christian hope and bid Christians cast their hopes toward an imperishable heaven that needed no renewal. Nevertheless we can continue to call early Christians otherworldly. Their hopes were cast into a future that God would initiate: they did not have the slightest conception of a task involving the manipulation of power and the capture of the institutions of the world to baptize them into Christ. They sat loosely to the goods of this world. Let us add that at their best they practiced in their mutual service a magnificent materialism, in the redeemed sense of that word. The monastic's exaggerated scorn for the body was of later date. May we add that from our point of view, the finest Christian otherworldliness will combine the best of both elements in the time-hallowed contrast of Greek and Jew. It will be as far from a strained and God-denying asceticism on the one hand as it will be from a gluttonous concern for pleasure and power and comfort. This need for comprehension and good balance is expressed in a different way by Von Hügel, when he calls for "a sufficient otherworldliness without fanaticism, and a sufficient this-worldliness without philistinism."

It will not be necessary to review at length the fortunes of otherworldliness in the course of Christian history. The student will see monasticism draining off the passion for heroic devotion to the heavenly end, and the secular church in mortal combat with society and the state for the right to manipulate power. He will see Protestantism challenge the two-leveled ethic of the Middle Ages and insist on the one standard for all Christians living in the world of men. He will read the charges that have been made against the Protestant movement for having begotten and sanctioned the grossest hypocrisy and the most astute combinations of otherworldly

professions and this-worldly actions. He may even wonder if the Catholic teaching on special vocation does not offer a suggestion that Protestants may well ponder. The monastery may not come back to Protestantism, but the salt of Protestantism may very well prove to be its men and women of the otherworldly vocation. The detached and godly person in home and market place is indeed the city set on a hill, the shadow of a mighty rock in a weary land.

The current debates on pacifism may illuminate our discussion. We have, I believe, achieved in our Protestant world a rather remarkable degree of tolerance and even of sympathy with the pacifist protest against war. Scores of thousands of intelligent and well-informed Christians, investing heavily in the cause of the United States against the Axis, investing both life and property, are yet friendly to the pacifist as to one bearing a necessary witness, lest some note in the Christian symphony of truth be muted, to the common loss of all Christendom. Among earnest Christian pacifists may be found many contemporary representatives of an otherworldly Christianity. Pacifism is their divinely ordained vocation, and at their best they will pay a heavy price to maintain a clear witness. Once again perhaps we need to remind ourselves that their consciously-chosen goal may not be heaven, but rather a redeemed and warless world. Christianity ever moves back and forth between the implications of "Thy kingdom come on earth," and "Our citizenship is in heaven." But inasmuch as the Christian normally believes in God the Father, in Jesus Christ the Eternal Son, and in the life everlasting, we may call the Christian pacifist, and even the Christian man-in-arms for that matter, an otherworldly Christian in so far as he gives himself with abandon to a great cause for the glory of God and in obedience to the spirit of Christ.

The Marxian has ever charged that our Christian hopes of heaven have been narcotic, and essentially treasonable to the human race. He has lamented the energy expended on devotion to the heavenly Christ and the eternal kingdom as sheer waste in a world that desperately needs every ounce of human energy that can be devoted to pressing the cause of social righteousness. At this point the Christian can only indicate his faith that an exclusively this-worldly goal is not worthy of the whole aspiration of the human creature. The hunger of the religious man is for the eternal vision and the completion of life in God. The religious man never forgets that all men are mortal: for him it is not possible that God should close the book when a man dies in the body. The socialist dream simply will not satisfy the whole man.

As a matter of fact, the Christian can point to a whole pantheon of otherworldly Christians who have wrought miracles for the amelioration of our human lot. It would seem as if a deep devotion to the Eternal

released a great store of energy of which the world's faltering idealism has gladly availed itself. Often by direction and often by indirection this energy has been turned savingly toward human betterment. The great men of the Anglican evangelicals of a century or more ago, or of the Anglo-Catholics since that time, are familiar examples. The names of such men as William Wilberforce and Lord Shaftesbury, of Bishop Gore and Father Stanton, will come at once to mind. Chalmers and Guthrie, of the Scottish evangelicals, were preachers of an otherworldly Christian faith; yet they wrought valiantly for the cause of social integrity. Or think of the faithful folk-lovers who serve in the Salvation Army, aiming first to save souls, but never neglecting the wasted or hungry bodies. A false or debased otherworldliness will run from people and their problems to indulge in selfish devotions. The Christian, his Lord a citizen of two worlds through his incarnation, will make his best contribution through imaginative devotion to the Lord of glory who is also the yearning Saviour of living men, and who truly cares that the slums be cleared away, that laboring men achieve self-respect and equal opportunity, and that a just peace shall enfold the world.

It is hard to conceive of a Christian ethic that does not involve the double citizenship, and hard to rebut Paul's conviction that our primary citizenship is in heaven, or the contention of the apostles that "we must obey God rather than men." The otherworldly Christian is elected to right a balance that has been grossly endangered, at least since the Renaissance painted up the good and the glory of life on earth. With Christians on every hand deeply involved, willingly or unwillingly, joyfully or sadly, in the building of business empires, with savage competition for the chief seats at the table of power, with amassing fortunes, and with winning wars, the true otherworldly Christian lives with a certain indifference to the whole world-gaining aspect of life, somewhat skeptical of the motives alleged by the fighters. He is often charged with irresponsibility, but at his best he is bearing the burdens that others are neglecting and is keeping alive in the public consciousness, as far as he is able, the ultimate goals of life, the eternal stars beyond the smoke we make in the holocaust of power. He is truly a lover of the whole human family, and he longs to be spent for God and for the people. He believes he can make his best contribution to the cleaner life of earth by his detachment from it power, pomp, style, and pride.

Of the type we are describing, the best man today is one, I believe, who hardly cares to proselyte for his own particular interpretations of Christian duty, for he knows how close they may be to immemorial heresies of head and heart. He does not care to organize new churches or sects. He does not cherish a peculiar body of dogma. He does his

best as leaven within the existing churches. He holds his way with humor. His eyes on a broad horizon, he can say to the fretful pusher: "Why so hot, little fellow?" And yet he is not a stranger to godly indignation when the lovely patience of the poor is abused or when little children are offended against. And if the successful pusher comes around in the day of need to offer him the loaf of bread and the dollar bill, he can smile thankfully and say: "We seem after all to be necessary to each other." St. Francis and those first charming disciples of his were scarcely parasites; nor are the present-day pacifists in prison or in camp, guardians and trustees, shall we call them, for one great sector of the Christian conscience.

Christianity has never been successfully domesticated in this world. The otherworldly Christian, who really does move among us now in varying degrees of purity to type, represents an authentic and an indispensable feather in this human forest of birds. With the forest burning down on every side, maybe he is God's appointed servant in this hour to lead us to cleaner nests.

"When one thinks of it," said Henry Drummond in a letter, "it is the unworldly people who have really helped us the most." A more positive adjective than Drummond's is the one we have been using. Let us express his thought, or our own, in a fuller way: It is the people of a firm but sane otherworldliness, with a strong grip on God and heaven, and in ardent love with the eternal soul of man, and careless of all the rewards and honors earth can offer—it is these who have helped and influenced us most.

MR. CHAIRMAN: A POINT OF ORDER

EDWARD BURNS SHAW

Northminster Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia

LIKE the proverbial novice in the familiar advertisement of a few years ago at whom "they laughed when I sat down at the piano," so the man who has the temerity to rise to a point of order is often greeted with derision by his associates. He is a nuisance when the majority is riding high, wide, and handsome. He is considered generally in the class of the heckler and the die-hard. It is whispered that, argument and voters failing his cause, he now turns to some new trick of procedure or rule to save it. A grand impatience is exhibited by some good brother whose pious phrases in ecclesiastical assemblies cover the multitude of sins, procedural and ethical, which are committed when churchmen get together. In other groups it may be the solid citizen, whose position or money makes him arbiter of all disputes, whose disdain of any waste of time on the niceties of debate carries the day against fairness in discussion and the rights of the ordinary member of the society. In politics, the party whip or the shrewd leader of one of the blocs whose logrolling has already been done leads the charge and rides roughshod over all opposition.

Perhaps, instead of decrying the evils of this present world, it might be well to get on with our subject. The minister's task goes far beyond his church or classroom. There is not only the association, conference, classis, diocese, presbytery, or what have you, to which he belongs but organizations and groups both within and without his church. In these, to be effective, he must know something of parliamentary law—in other words, he must know the courteous, fair, and efficient way to do business in a group. To justify a knowledge of parliamentary procedure the writer needs but to recall to your pure minds church assemblies in which you have sat. Again and again some of us have watched helplessly as some good measure was defeated because at the vital moment no proponent of the plan knew his parliamentary law. Or some new iniquity has been perpetrated upon the body ecclesiastic because no voice of authority was raised against it. Brethren, such things ought not so to be. In these days of specialization, not every minister can be a well-trained technician in all phases of every department of his wide field, but there is every reason why he should have a working knowledge of those areas of his work which are important. In many communities the minister must be a member of many organizations, cultural, civic, and eleemosynary. In these a knowledge of the rules of parliamentary action is a necessity. A case in point arises to mind. A public school here in Philadelphia had long been under the dominance of a woman

principal who once a year arranged a "Parents' Day" and throughout the remainder of the year let parents feel that their presence, unless they were summoned, was not desired. When age required her retirement, a man of progressive ideas was made principal, and the parents found in him a friend who welcomed the organization of a parent-teacher association. A minister near by was asked to preside at the organization meeting. It happened that he had had some experience in presiding over popular meetings and knew something of parliamentary procedure. A committee carefully chosen by the principal and some interested parents and teachers was elected to nominate officers. The minister was unanimously chosen as the first president, because, as one member of the committee put it, "he is a 'natural.'" Most "naturals" are a product of knowledge and experience. While being elected president was an honor, the important thing was that the parliamentary knowledge gave an opportunity to shape the course of a new and sorely needed organization in the community. Incidentally it meant the launching of a movement that brought into friendly relations Jew and gentile in a section of the city where they were almost equally represented. Thus Robert's *Rules of Order* again paid big dividends.

To take a realm more familiar to all of you by experience and/or reading, let us examine the late unpleasantness commonly called the fundamentalist-modernist controversy. Making all allowance for the obscurantism, blind prejudice, and personal animosities shown by the fundamentalists and made evident to most as time went on, nevertheless the final solution of the controversy came essentially by the way of polity and procedure rather than by any resolving of the matters of faith ostensibly in dispute. At every point in the long-drawn-out battle in the Presbyterian Church the decisive element was procedural. In the beginning, the right to present, debate, and vote upon a minority report before the General Assembly led to the formal opening of the controversy. Again, in spite of all that could be done to soften the shock, the rule concerning the retention of a stated supply of another communion prevailed in regard to Dr. Fosdick at old First Presbyterian Church of New York City. In the first two rounds the fundamentalists won because they knew what they wanted and how to get it. As a result men who had neglected the study of the Form of Government and parliamentary procedure awakened to its value. Spontaneously many throughout the church began to search these new scriptures and with joy found in them the eternal freedoms of the fathers. Beginning with the semilegal document of the "Auburn" Affirmation, which was but a giant protest of over 1,300 of the 9,000 ministers of the communion, there were, in due course, produced the reports of the Special Commission of 1925, the reports of the Special Commission on Princeton Theological Seminary, the report of the General Council on the status of the Independent

Board, which was written by the present stated clerk of the General Assembly, and the administrative and judicial trials before the series of courts or judicatories of the church. The climax came in connection with the administrative and judicial cases which came before the General Assembly of 1936. Every case was won, for by this time the miscalled modernists had learned the value of parliamentary and judicial procedure and had developed the techniques necessary. It is interesting to note that a long-standing precedent (225 years) was shattered by one decision—entirely on the ground of parliamentary procedure, when a man, who had been presumably licensed and ordained by a presbytery in spite of protest and warning, was reduced to the status of a student for the ministry. What many to this day do not know is that of the judicial cases which came up from five presbyteries one was chosen as the test case simply on the ground that that presbytery's committee on prosecution had carefully and meticulously followed the rules of procedure. Once this case was decided, the other four —although minor errors were found in process—were decided on the basis of the general ground covered in the test case. Thus an era of strain and stress passed because of the safeguards of rule and procedure. In such a time of controversy, personalities are likely to gain ascendancy over principles, but the following of law and constitution lifts the whole matter above personalities and establishes an impersonal basis of settlement.

In using this example let me hasten to say that I am not suggesting that you all become ecclesiastical lawyers and professional counsel for church litigation. The real point to all this is that had the reasonable and natural and proper procedure been followed from the beginning, so much of dissension and heartache and loss might have been avoided. The values found as ultimately curative should have been utilized as preventative. I venture the opinion that this is true of the similar controversy in sister communions.

What are the reasons for rules of parliamentary procedure? Isn't it true that, although they may be necessary at times in order to curb some obstreperous brother, ordinarily we need not bother with them? I should like to give a few reasons for parliamentary law. These are not all that might be adduced, but they are cogent and they serve to lift the whole matter above the level of the merely technical to that of the practical and ethical.

The most important reason for parliamentary law is the very obvious, but nevertheless often overlooked one, that it is the best method for expediting business in a group. In Britain the standard is set by the customs and rules of the House of Parliament—hence the name *Parliamentary* law. In this country the general standard and final appeal are the rules and procedure of the United States House of Representatives, unless the matter

is covered by some specific rule of the organization. The plan of organization—officers, committees, docket, and the like—is the basis. For this organization to function there must be rules of order. Otherwise business will be in a hopeless muddle. The reader is asked to put himself in the following situation. You are presiding over an organization; a motion is made and properly seconded. After some debate an amendment is proposed, seconded, and debated. An amendment to the amendment is then moved and seconded, and after some debate a member rises and moves the "previous question." This motion is seconded. Now, as presiding officer, what is the procedure? The precedence of motions, the rules of debate and of voting are all designed to get the best possible results in a deliberative assembly. There are free souls who do not like order and precision and who grow impatient, but like those who strenuously object to order in worship, they are likely to replace it with as rigid an order of their own, one much less tried and proven. Occasionally rules and the usual procedure work a hardship upon some individual, and assemblies, especially ecclesiastical groups, should welcome the exception that may correct injustice. But there should be short shrift to the brother who considers the general rules as beneath his notice and who ignores the specific methods of procedure and demands "personal privilege" since in his own mind he is too big to be bound by rules. The fact is that he is generally too little. Most ecclesiastical assemblies have found that Robert's *Rules of Order* need adaptation to meet their especial requirements, but these still remain the basis—and a very good one.

A second reason for parliamentary law is to facilitate the handling of discussion: addressing the chair; the recognition of one who wishes to speak; interruptions, when allowable and when not; alternating in debate, limitations on the duration and number of speeches, methods of cutting off debate, etc. There are a few simple rules that apply almost universally, and these should be in the mind of every member of a deliberate body, especially if he has any intention of doing more than cast his vote when the question is put. For the one who aspires to be a chairman, moderator, or president, this knowledge should be a prerequisite.

A third reason for parliamentary law is the important one of the protection of the rights of minorities. In the resurgence of democracy we are witnessing over the world today this is no little matter. The writer sat in a discussion group recently when the subject was the rights and duties of members of labor organizations. There was a prevalent feeling that many of our American labor unions—both locals and the area and national organizations—had denied any real consideration to minorities. One of the most delicate and difficult problems at the present time and in the near future of the postwar world is this question of the rights and essential freedoms of minorities at home and abroad. How very necessary it is, then,

that in our organizations here we safeguard the rights and freedoms of our minorities. An inconsiderate majority may become oppressive and intolerant unless those differing be given every proper opportunity of being heard. Many—really a remarkable share of the rules of order—are designed to protect minorities. If they are followed, even when sometimes it seems unnecessarily tedious, the result is often a strengthening of the position of the majority by this evidence of fairness. Suppression and impatience, on the other hand, have often hurt a good cause. Those who feel that they are working for a worthy purpose can well afford to be more than generous.

A fourth reason, and a corollary to the point just considered, is the recognition of the rights and basic freedom of the majority. Minorities can be, and often are, led by mere obstructionists, and sad is the case of that body whose rules place no restraints upon such. The rules of the United States Senate can scarcely be taken as a model for any ordinary deliberative assembly because they lend themselves to this tryranny of a minority. They carry democracy to such a degree that it ceases to be democracy and becomes an oligarchy of a few willful men. Hence most bodies have rules protecting the majority against mere obstruction and stubborn assertion of power on the part of a small percentage of the members. Agreements and decisions as to the length of speeches, limitation upon the full period of debate, setting of a time for the vote, and the more drastic "previous question" motion are all designed to curb unruly minorities. The bloc system in any deliberative assembly is a danger when, by combination, minorities can become a majority to defeat the general good of the organization in pay for special privileges. Perhaps some better way of dealing with this problem will arise out of the current revival of democracy. After all, democracy means the responsibility of a true majority, which should then be given the opportunity to function effectively.

The fifth reason for parliamentary law which comes to mind is the protection of the rights of the individual. Here is democracy in action! Here essentially is the triumph of Christianity—specifically of Protestant Christianity with the doctrine of the supreme worth of the individual. His right to question, debate, and vote is axiomatic in our deliberative assemblies. If he be a minority of one on a committee, he may bring in a minority report; it is generally given precedence, and he is given every opportunity to present his reasons. If he be defeated, he may have his vote recorded in the negative; he may even place in the record his reasons or a formal protest if it be couched in proper language. Most organizations safeguard these rights of the individual member and even add others. Possibly the classic example of the influence of an individual in a critical hour in national life is that of the late William Jennings Bryan. Securing the floor at the Baltimore Convention of his party, on the right to "explain his vote," Bryan

turned the tide in favor of Woodrow Wilson. History records the large results.

With every right and license there always goes the limitation upon that right; thus a sixth reason for parliamentary law is found in the restraint placed upon the conduct of members. Courtesy is the watchword here. The member must address the chair; must treat his fellow members with due deference; must avoid personalities; must not impugn the motives of others; must not interrupt a speaker except for very proper reasons, such as correcting a misstatement or calling attention to a point of order; must obey the rules of debate and procedure. These are but the enactment into law of the common practices of good social intercourse, but they are necessary often in meeting situations when convictions and prejudice carry debate into acrimony and diatribe. The principles in debate must always take precedence over the personal whims and failings of the debaters.

A seventh reason for parliamentary law is the definition of the rights and limitations of the organization itself. This is found in many forms, but a few suggestions will suffice. Personal liberties of members are generally carefully safeguarded, and rules are made against any undue intrusion upon their personalities and consciences. Matters belonging to this realm are often specifically exempt from legislation, and recommendations passed by majority vote are carefully distinguished from legislative or administrative acts and judicial decisions. The relation of the body to other similar bodies is generally defined and the relation of the body to superior or dependent bodies is specific and clear. Thus in many communions no local church charter can be changed to alter the relationship to the church at large. Fraternal and beneficial organizations have similar provisions. The changing of the character or purpose of any organization is subject to the provisions of the constitution and bylaws. The powers of national and regional organizations made up of delegates or commissioners are sharply defined. A chance majority present on a certain day cannot overturn the general policy and purpose.

It is evident that not all of the reasons for parliamentary law can be set forth in this brief treatise. Any one rule or custom may have found its place in the list for several different reasons. I shall content myself with mentioning just one more very weighty reason for parliamentary procedure. That reason is provision of the means for delay, study, and careful discussion of matters of consequence. Few deliberative bodies have as members those who are all qualified to become a town meeting for the discussion of all matters of interest. If all were qualified, few would have the patience and leisure for such deliberation. Hence all such bodies of any appreciable size and importance have committees charged with definite responsibilities. The rules provide for possible and often for required reference of certain

matters to the proper committees or to some special committee or commission. Many hasty and ill-advised actions are thus avoided. Reference is generally made easy, and unless there be personal interest or prejudice it becomes almost automatic. It is a truism to say that the real work of any deliberative body is done in the committees. Here is opportunity for frank discussion of the merits of a proposition away from the possible influence of the spellbinder; here quietly the facts may be ascertained or assignments of the work of investigation be made; here pomposity has a lesser place and frankness a greater value. Reference has its dangers, such as the pickling or pigeonholing of good ideas, the suppression of proper investigation, or the application of some arbitrary rule; but it has also its great advantages in the control of those obnoxious persons, commonly known as "aginners," who are forever seeking approval of their disapproval of all things old and new. Reference makes possible the conserving of a good idea which may otherwise have run afoul of some personal interest or have infringed upon the domain of some other committee. It has the general effect of settling things on their merits. All this is predicated upon the assumption that committees really function. And that runs back to personal responsibility. The most important matter in any organization which is expected to function effectively is the form and personnel of its organization into officers and committees. No form, however perfect, is effective alone, and no personnel can ever do effective work without the proper tools of organization. But combine these two, and you have the answer to most of the ills to which such bodies are subject.

A fine example of this fact is the recent organization of the present Presbytery of Philadelphia. For a whole year, a large democratically chosen group met and through subcommittees studied all of the problems involved. This group even studied personnel and nominated the officers and committees, and the result has exceeded the most sanguine hopes of the most optimistic. Committees, because they were carefully and representatively chosen, have functioned well. Their reports, sometimes on very controversial points, have been invariably adopted after due consideration, and the work of the Presbytery in spite of its size—the largest in the world—has been done surprisingly well—in fact, better than that of the smaller bodies which united to bring it into being. A mutual confidence and trust have been engendered, and although he would be rash indeed who predicted sunny skies and untroubled seas henceforth, I do believe that as long as the chart and compass of law and order are followed the course will be kept.

Perhaps enough has been said to redeem the subject from the accusation that it is as dry as dust. It seems to the writer to be filled with life and human interest. It should not be considered merely a technique in the narrower sense of that term but the means to a real end—the effective co-

operation within those basal groups of society which go to make up our democracy. As for the oft-heard charge that parliamentary procedure lends itself to political manipulation, the best answer is a proper use of the same means. Let us revert to that old well-tried text, "What is that in thine hand?" and use it.

Answer to problem proposed on p. 241

In spite of its ambiguous name the purpose of the "previous question" motion is merely to shut off debate. The presiding officer immediately puts the question thus, "Shall the main question be now put?" If carried (2/3 vote generally required), the vote is taken without further debate on 1. the amendment to the amendment; 2. the amendment as amended (or not); 3. the original motion as amended (or not).

THE INFORMALITY OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY

HENRY J. CADBURY

Harvard University

One feature of the earliest associations of Christians which it is most difficult to realize is their informality. The tendency to read our later developments backward into the past is natural, and can be cured only by resolutely challenging the unconscious assumptions of our less inchoate age.

Probably the New Testament itself shows signs of attributing present traits to the past. The book of Acts as a history of the church no doubt in places impresses the more developed view of the author upon the past; or, at least, a different point of view. Even the gospels, when they put "church" into Jesus' mouth, or interpret John's baptism in the perspective of church usage, or collect sayings of Jesus to the Twelve or to the Seventy in the spirit of the later Christian mission, are assuming anachronistically the forms of thought, speech, and action of the intervening period. More conscious fathering of the present on the past appears in the Pastoral Epistles and the Didache (the latter with perhaps a countertendency to archaize or primitivize). The ancients were less on guard against this fallacy than are those moderns who have been taught to regard all history as evolutionary. But in spite of this warning recognized in other areas, in the area of the sacred institution of the church the usual informality of beginnings is often overlooked by modern churchmen.

The currency of a suitable name for a group of persons is a mark of distinctiveness. The lack of a nomenclature goes hand in hand with a lack of clear demarcation from other persons. Both for the group as a whole and for the individual as belonging to it the earliest Christians show a variety of phrase rather than uniformity, and here as elsewhere variety indicates a lack of settled or formal crystallization. Some kind of designation was needed in the most incipient stage, but many of the terms used in the New Testament seem to have been tentative, alternative, and short-lived.

To our organization-conscious age it seems absurd to suggest that there was ever any obscurity about whether or not there was a definite thing one belonged to and whether or not a given person belonged to it. But I believe membership in the usual modern sense was not a concept of the early church. Belonging was doubtless much more to a supernatural person than to a church. The fellowship was a by-product of similar individual commitments, ideas, and experiences. But though similar they would be far from identical. Rigid edges would not exist, and

the transition in and out would be gradual and often unnoticed. No census would be really possible, and there would be no reason to make one. It would be difficult to name any simple test of inclusion. Most Christians were baptized, but baptism—I state my conviction, without arguing it—was not a rite of initiation into the church. It had to do with the individual's relation to Christ and to what God and Christ were thought to expect of him, and what he expected of them. No doubt most Christians would assent to the words "Jesus Lord" and dissent from the words "Jesus anathema," but this was no creed, or test, or "basis." It is difficult to believe that even in connection with the support of its "poorer members" the early Christians were in the habit of "keeping a roll."[1] Some of the least organized modern movements probably supply the best parallels to the truly primitive Christian movement. In the Oxford Group, as I understand it, you neither apply for membership nor resign it. There is no admission and no dropping of members. For its first eighty-five years Quakerism neither took in members nor listed them; they did not count members even locally nor did they have any way of identifying members except as persons who "went under the name" of Quakers.

In the matter of leadership spontaneity, variety, and informality were, by present standards, extreme. When Paul describes from the divine side the unity of the spirit and the diversity of gifts, he implies from the human side a minimum of interference or arrangement. What modern scholars call charismatic when speaking theologically, they would call functional when speaking sociologically. The terminology for the Christian leadership is varied from the first, and even when definite terms arise, like presbyter and bishop, they are sometimes identical, sometimes hierarchical, and sometimes literally descriptive. Streeter's *Primitive Church* did well to suggest that probably more than one kind of organization was "primitive." But just as the textual critics tell us that often behind variants the original text had no words at all, so often behind variant forms of church usage or organization there may have been an absence of form or usage altogether. As has been recently said by Canon Raven, the church was organic rather than organized.

I Corinthians 14 gives an impression of worship of a highly spontaneous character. There were habitual types of vocal participation, but no habitual order, proportion, or participants. Apparently there was no program of service and no presiding officer (humanly speaking) to "conduct" the service. The only Pauline word that could be translated "presiding"[2] probably means "care for" or "help,"[3] though in Justin it means "preside."

[1] E. F. Scott, *The Validity of the Gospel Record*, 1938, p. 111.
[2] So Spencer at I Thess. 5: 12; cf. I Cor. 14: 16 "layman"!
[3] Rom. 12: 8 and the Pastorals.

Paul's remedy for the disorder in worship was not an order of worship or appointed participants. He evidently anticipated continuance of democratic, unprogrammed, spontaneous expression. What he urged was more self-criticism, intelligence, and restraint; not a moderator, but moderation on the part of men and women generally. Paul's references to the oral participation of women,[4] if not contradictory, are obscure. So is the behavior of Diotrephes criticized in III John. But nowhere in the New Testament do I find any suggestion that individuals who were selected for any church duty took over the bulk of the oral aspect of worship, or monopolized the baptizing or the breaking of bread.

Conspicuous by their absence from our oldest records are references to regular times or regular places of meeting. The early chapters of Acts suggest that they met daily in the temple, or that they broke bread often, either at home or in their several homes.[5] We may suppose that the synagogue and the Sabbath continued to be the principal answers to this question of time and place. It is commonly assumed that the letters of Paul mention churches that gathered into the homes of certain Christians mentioned by name. The phrase is: ". . . with (and) the church that is in his (her, their, thy) house."[6] But fully as frequent are phrases that imply natural and prior grouping: the household of Stephanas,[7] those of Chloe,[8] those of Aristobulus, or of Narcissus,[9] the household of Cæsar.[10] These cases, whether with or without the Greek word *house,* are probably to be understood as *familiæ,* particularly including slaves. And for that reason a locale of meeting is scarcely intended to be designated.

In like manner a regular day for distinctively Christian worship is not plainly mentioned before Justin Martyr. The earlier references to the first day of the week or the Lord's day are few and carry with them no evidence of regularity of religious expression on that day. Paul advised the Corinthians to contribute money on that day regularly,[11] but there the phrase implies that each is to lay it aside at home. We cannot prove from silence the irregularity of early Christians in such matters, but neither can we assume regularity, in the absence of evidence about time and place.

The reasons for this informality—what for modern sects churchmen call irregularity—are not hard to seek. The first believers already had a fairly regular religious belief and cultus that was not specifically Chris-

[4] I Cor. 11: 5 and 14: 34.

[5] See note on Acts 2: 46 in Lake and Cadbury, *The Beginnings of Christianity,* Vol. IV, pp. 29 f.

[6] Rom. 16: 5; I Cor. 16: 19; Col. 4: 15; Philm. 2.

[7] I Cor. 1: 16; 16: 15.

[8] I Cor. 1: 11.

[9] Rom. 16: 10, 11.

[10] Phil. 4: 22.

[11] I Cor. 16: 2.

tian. There was a calendar, there were scriptures, there were synagogue services. The things that marked them *qua* Christians need not add to or replace these adequate forms. In fact such features as the life of the Spirit were notoriously irregular and unconforming. Coöperation or group experience was largely the parallelism of independent individuals. The idea of admission could exist only when a somewhat fixed grouping replaced the idea of a society or fellowship. One can agree with Professor Howard[12] that ecclesiastical order was the dominant interest of the letters of Ignatius and that the duty of observing order in religious services is pressed upon the church of Corinth by Clement of Rome, but it does not follow that for the early church as a whole its life "was an ordered life, with duly recognized ministries of service and administration, with a general outline of Christian teaching as well as a traditional form of evangelic proclamation, and with sacramental observances for the initiation of converts and for the maintenance of fellowship with one another by the common meal." To generalize from special and late emphases would be as erroneous as to argue from early silences, as if, for example, the absence of any reference prior to Justin Martyr to scripture reading in Christian worship proved that this very natural practice was not at some times and some places to be found in the first century.

The doctrine of the church disclosed in the New Testament is as informal as the practice. The Pauline epistles have some eloquent things to say about this as about other features of the new faith. But in no area is Paul really formulating a doctrine; the very variety of his expression, and its relation to his temporary context, confirm that. A painstaking study can be made of what his words on any subject would imply if taken as part of a system of thought. With other New Testament writings they imply holiness, authority, unity, etc., for the group. Our concern here is to indicate not what was the content of the doctrine, but that it is nuclear and tentative—illustrations, rather than definitions.

Causes leading to formulation and formality were operative from early times. Older and more organized groups set the pattern for new ones. Evidently terms like *ecclesia, brother, elder* (presbyter), came from older communities, religious or secular, Jewish or gentile. A few new terms were invented, *e.g., Christian.* Probably the aspects of Christian life more substantial than terminology were also partly imitated, or inherited. If the name *disciple* was inherited from before the crucifixion, so no doubt was the strategic importance of some of those who bore it. Judaism provided both the concept of Scripture and definite Scriptures.

Considerations of inherent convenience and value gave stability to features both old and new. In time the sheer force of habit stereotyped

[12] W. F. Howard, *Christianity According to St. John,* 1943, pp. 129 ff.

the thought and practice of Christians as applied to the collective side of their religion. Changes were made, due to new needs or new influences, but they were rarely in the direction of greater spontaneity and informality.

Among the most powerful influences differentiating and regimenting Christians would be external pressure, both persecution and "heresy." They would solidify organization or regulate practice and even more they would standardize group consciousness. Negative factors often do more to create group consciousness than all positive forces of common experience and feeling. When circles are drawn, they are usually drawn to keep others out. Against the Christians it was the persecutors who drew the circle; against the heretics it was the orthodox.

The present memorandum is not a plea to make the primitive church normative for us today. "No form" as norm sounds paradoxical. To recapture all that early informality would probably be impossible, were it desirable. Much might be said in favor of trying to secure some of its fluidity and formlessness for the sake of the present-day advantages. But any one who claims to use the primitive church as a norm must be aware of what he is rejecting, if he ignores its freedom from both form and uniformity. Within New Testament times there was growth or change from decade to decade and even contemporary variety. To select one variety or one period would be arbitrary historically, if otherwise thoroughly justifiable. What features of the church now extinct were once usual or at least occasional? Probably they are as numerous proportionately as are the terms that were not continued. For the latter I may cite "slave of Jesus Christ," "brotherhood," "Nazarene," "way," etc.; for the former, "working miracles," "baptism for the dead," the "agape," "condemning to Satan," "widows." The less tangible features of the Apostolic age, its own mentality as contrasted with our own assumptions, are so difficult to imagine and to re-present, that we are prone to mark likenesses and imagine continuity since that is the easier process. The historian must see that neglected facts are recalled, no matter how inconvenient they may seem to those who wish to represent primitive Christianity revived.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

THERE is said to have been a devout old lady who not infrequently bore testimony that, while she could never open the "dear old book" without finding it full of spiritual blessing, the word which had helped her most to bear her cross as a consecrated Christian was that beautiful word *Mesopotamia.* I do not vouch for the historicity of the devout old lady. In fact, I strongly suspect that she emanates from the homiletic arcana which supplies the details for so many pulpit true stories.

But assuming the story to be true—perhaps in her yesteryears some preacher with round full voice had retarded caressingly on the antepenult and had thus made the word for her evermore sacrosanct—the fact remains that the old lady had first to read in what she then read out. And there are many such *Mesopotamias.*

One of them is the opening word of Psalm 103:

> "Bless the Lord, O my soul;
> *And all that is within me,* bless his holy name."

How those italicized words roll off our tongues! Many would seem, as they intone them, to agree with the old preacher, Perowne, quoted with approbation in the *Preacher's Complete Homiletical Commentary:* "David would enlist every thought, faculty, power, the heart with all its affections, the will, the conscience, the reason, in a word, the whole spiritual being, all in man that is best and highest, in the same heavenly service." Actually this is a pretty poetical paraphrase of the distinctly prosy *kŏl-qᵉrābi,* which means simply "my inwards," the several organs of my body, more especially "my intestines." It can scarcely be doubted that this rather more literal rendition would result in decreased unction in that portion of our religious service known as the Responsive Reading, when that particular Psalm chanced to be selected; but even that might not be an unmitigated evil. Nor is it to be objected that this is a burlesque; that in the West we have, so to speak, raised the several seats of psychic reactions one stage higher, assigning to the head what the Hebrew ascribed to the heart, to the heart what he located more forthrightly in the lower cavity. The fact remains that were we to substitute "heart" for the phrase in question, it would probably seem less satisfying, less pleasurably vague and all-embracing. "Heart" sounds like "heart"; but "all that is within me" does not appear to mean "all that is within me," but to justify the pious, if long-winded, observation of Perowne, although to the Psalmist in all probability it was a very prosy and literal, if inelegant, Hebrew equivalent of "my guts." In fact, the observation of the old commentator, John Trable, may not be utterly gratuitous: "In peace-offerings God called for the fat and the inwards." Be that as it may, there can be little question but in this phrase

what we like is not so much what is really there as what we think we see in it. Perhaps that is one of the advantages of translations—at any rate, there are many such cases where if this were not done we would be forced to Shorter Bibles. Nevertheless, again and again to the man reasonably at home in Hebrew and Greek Philip's question to Candace's treasurer comes to mind: "Understandest thou what thou readest?"

A particularly glaring example of our fondness for *Mesopotamias* is found in another Psalm, this time the forty-second:

> "Deep calleth unto deep at the noise of thy waterfalls:
> All thy waves and thy billows are gone over me."

Here there would seem to be no possible ground for misunderstanding. An exile from Jerusalem, perhaps a levitical singer homesick for Zion and its temple, whither he had been wont to go with the throng, with the voice of joy and praise, sees in the scene around him the symbol of his fate. If, as the preceding verse suggests, he is in the upper Jordan valley—perhaps near Panias, with its shrine of unknown antiquity—the raging stream before him, swollen by the winter rain, roaring through the narrow defile in its noisy descent, sending its echoes from side to side of the valley, suggests to him afresh the flood of trouble which God is sending against his people. Like these cataracts of the swirling river before his homesick eyes—the old rendering *waterspouts* is quite unjustified—are the woes flooding upon him and his fellow exiles, breaking over them and seemingly calling to one another as they seek to destroy the struggling swimmers, mocking their misery. Moffatt portrays it magnificently:

> "Flood follows flood, as thy cataracts thunder,
> thy breakers and billows are all surging over me."

Many the man who knows all too well what that means!

Yet how often the first four words of that magnificent line are wrested from their context and are read as a sort of equivalent to our modernized "all that is within me bless his holy name," or, perhaps better said, to Augustine's oft-quoted word: "Our souls are restless until they find rest in thee." The deep unexpressed and unexpressable longings of the human breast find their proper destination only in the depths of the divine wisdom and love.

Surely this is a praiseworthy and entirely proper sentiment, and there is ample support for it in biblical phrases which really express it. But why try to read it into words to which it is utterly foreign, and thus spoil a magnificent, if altogether different, picture? If Everyman, especially if he be a preacher, would vow never to quote a verse of Scripture without thinking of the line before and after, he might at first find his style distinctly cramped, but his dividends would be large.

From Off the Campus and On

To ATTEMPT to come to grips with George Santayana, the man and his message, requires strong reins. That Professor Ferm was justified in the attempt few will question after reading his discriminating and discerning essay. Dr. Ferm has been a member of the faculty of Wooster College since 1928, becoming head of the department of philosophy ten years later. He is a graduate of Augustana College and Augustana Theological Seminary and a doctor of philosophy from Yale. He is an ordained Lutheran minister, and prior to going to Yale for graduate work had been a parish minister in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. He is a member of the American Philosophical Association, the American Theological Society, and the American Society of Church History. He has written several texts on philosophy and many articles in professional journals and dictionaries. At the present moment he is engaged in the exacting task of seeing the *American Dictionary of Theology*, of which he is the editor, through the press.

Professor Taylor is best introduced in his own breezy words, written from Fort Lauderdale, Florida: "As for my personal data: I am twenty-nine years of age, B.A. and M.A. from Toronto University, doctorate in philosophy from the University of London, England; assistant professor of philosophy, University of Wisconsin; author of two essays on Hume, an essay on æsthetics, another on literary history, two on the function of philosophy in the modern world, and other odds and ends, published in the standard philosophical and literary journals. At present I am engaged in confidential war work for the United States Government." Readers of the CROZER QUARTERLY will remember his salty book review, published in the January, 1944, issue, which review, incidentally, led to the request for the present article. We hope that it will be but the first of many articles in these pages.

Giorgio Levi Della Vida is an Arabist of world renown. He was born in Venice, and received the degree of doctor of philosophy from the University of Rome in 1901. Following studies in Greece and Egypt, he became associate editor of *Annali dell' Islam*. He was consecutively professor of Arabic and Islamics at the Oriental Institute of Naples, and of Semitics at the Universities of Turin and Rome. For his refusal to take the oath of allegiance he was dismissed by the fascist government, and subsequently was associated for eight years with the Vatican Library. Since 1939 he has been on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania. Here is a case where in the words of the soberest realism Italy's loss has been America's gain. The CROZER QUARTERLY is happy to welcome this distinguished scholar to its pages.

It is a pleasure to have Professor Prentice once more among our contributors. Many of our readers have written to express their appreciation of his essay, "The Classics and the Bible," which appeared in January, 1943. In this present brief essay he sounds a note which sorely needed sounding. For forty-seven years he was a member of the faculty of Princeton University, becoming professor *emeritus* in 1941. His many books and articles on the classics have made him too well known to require more than a hearty welcome.

Dr. Austin is doubly qualified to discuss the gifted Dr. Ferris. For several years, following his graduation from Crozer, Dr. Austin was student minister of the First Baptist Church of Philadelphia. Dr. Ferris had been gone for fifteen years, but, writes Dr. Austin, "the influence of his radiant spirit was still evident everywhere." And then Dr. Austin is himself a preacher of no mean ability, as his recent volume of sermons, *The Harvest of the Spirit,* reviewed in these pages in April, 1943, reveals. Since 1939, following a five-year ministry in Canandaigua, New York, he has been minister of the Tioga Baptist Church in Philadelphia. In addition to his B.D. from Crozer he holds a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania.

Professor Brush's disarming essay will be read and reread. And those who know him will recognize his right to speak as he does. Since 1940 he has held the chair of church history at Andover Newton, of which he is an alumnus. Following a nine-year pastorate at the First Baptist Church in New Haven he was called to the First Baptist Church of Waterville, Maine, where he remained until called to Andover Newton. Colby College, of which he is a graduate and to which he ministered during his years in Waterville, honored him with a D.D. upon his departure. Graduate work at Yale, in preparation for his seminary teaching, resulted in a Ph.D.

For more than twenty years Dr. Shaw has been the minister of Presbyterian churches in Philadelphia: pastor of the North Church from 1922 to 1932 and copastor of the merged North-Mutchmore Church from 1932 to 1942, since 1942 pastor of the Northminster Church. He holds degrees from Cedarville College and Western Theological Seminary and a doctorate of divinity from Washington College. He is a member of the Permanent Judicial Commission of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., and knows thus at first hand the need for a knowledge of the subject he so ably discusses.

Professor Cadbury is no stranger to these pages. His articles and reviews have always received a wide and appreciative reading. He has been a member of the Haverford, Andover Theological Seminary, Episcopal Theological Seminary, and Bryn Mawr faculties, and now holds

the Hollis professorship of divinity at Harvard. For many years he was the secretary of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis and its president in 1936. His books and articles on the New Testament have been many and important. His *Style and Literary Method of Luke* and *The Making of Luke-Acts* made him an admirable coauthor with Kirsopp Lake of the monumental commentary on Acts in *The Beginnings of Christianity*, while his admirable volume, *The Peril of Modernizing Jesus*, will not soon be forgotten. He is an active member of the Society of Friends, and was engaged in child-feeding in Germany at the close of the last war. For several years he was editor of the *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, and since 1930 has been a member of the American Standard Bible Commission.

Once more we are able to present a good grist of book reviews and notices by specialists "from off the campus and on." Dr. Arbuckle, a graduate of Crozer, has been for twenty-five years minister of the First Baptist Church, Newton Centre, Massachusetts, and since 1929 associate professor of preaching at Andover Newton. Dr. Beck is professor of Bible at Syracuse University. Dr. Bixler, president of Colby College, and a former member of the faculties of Smith and Harvard, is a regular contributor to these pages. Professor Bower was for many years professor of religious education at the University of Chicago, and is now a professor *emeritus*. Dr. Colwell, of the same university, is dean of the Divinity School and of the University faculties. In addition to these administrative duties he is a member of the department of New Testament. Dr. Franklin, now president *emeritus* of Crozer, needs no introduction to Crozer or other Baptist fellowships at home or abroad. His many friends will be interested to learn that he now resides in Richmond, hard by his beloved University of Richmond. Professor Harkness has been for many years professor of church history at Crozer and president of the American Baptist Historical Society. Dr. Matthews, for over twenty years professor of Old Testament at Crozer, is now professor *emeritus*. Professor Moehlman has been for many years professor of church history at Colgate-Rochester. He retires from active teaching this June, but we hope that he will long continue his pleasant association with the CROZER QUARTERLY. Mr. Morey is supervising principal of the Swarthmore (Pa.) public schools. Dr. Piper is professor of New Testament at Princeton Theological Seminary. Dr. Pritchard is finishing his second year as professor of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Rose is in his twentieth year as minister of the First Baptist Church of Philadelphia, and is a member of the General Council of the Northern Baptist Convention and of the Executive Committee of the Federal Council. Professor Wilder, for several years professor of New Testament at Andover Newton, now holds a similar chair at the Chicago Theological Seminary.

BOOK REVIEWS

From Science to God, by Karl Schmidt, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. 169, $2.00.

This is an interesting book with a suggestive argument for God. Briefly, the steps are as follows. Each system of knowledge begins with a "generating problem." Physicists, for example, found their problem in the fact that sensory experiences were not reliable and that thought realities like atoms must be set up. Different generating problems have given rise to different systems or universes, and truth is a quality of propositions within a given universe. The laws of free falling bodies are irrelevant in ethics just as the Ten Commandments are in physics.

Existence is defined as what is warranted by true propositions. Reality is existence as an object. Actuality is existence as a subject. If there are different types of system, there must be different types of existents. A line is a different type from a mass, and a religious entity is different from either. The generating problem of religion arises when we consider the subject pole of experience as contrasted with the object pole whose existents are found in other systems. The physicist is a subject as well as an object, and his experiments show his dependence on free voluntary actions performed under the influence of chosen ends. All attempts to rule out the distinctiveness of the soul as a centre of spiritual activity have proved abortive. Even the modern science of mental testing deals not only with events in the stream of thought but with the soul and its capacities for thought. By definition the soul is an actuality, not a reality. It is a creative actuality that thinks objects such as general ideas.

The soul thinks a general object, let us say an idea of a triangle. How does it happen that such a thought idea can be held in common by two or more where sense experiences cannot? It is notorious that sense objects are untrustworthy; yet we can agree on general ideas and indeed use them to compare and find the flaws in objects of sense. The fact is that my thought objects are the same as yours only when we both think what is really there. Only in the degree that our thoughts are true do we claim identity. Now, when you and I think what is true, it is because God thinks through us. It is God who is responsible for the commonness of thought objects. Similarly if through adequate criteria we can establish anything as truly good or beautiful, we must see that these things too are creations of God. All "reality" has its origin in God, the Creative Reason. From him it derives its truth and its authority. God is the origin of the common object.

God is not the creator of the world in its concreteness but only of whatever there is of reality in this concretion. He is the creator of what is permanent, of what is independent of us as individuals, of whatever is of goodness, truth, and beauty.

This thesis reminds the reader of certain elements in the post-Kantian tradition, but it is developed in a novel way and with reference to our present intellectual climate. The chief difficulty comes from what is left unsaid. "Wherever reality is created man is present as creator and God is present in him and his creative act," says the author (p. 82). Thus there could have been no "reality" in the technical sense before man. What was God doing before man came on the scene? And what kind of concretions did the world have before man's advent? Was there no mathematical form in prehuman physical events? Further, although this "actual" God is, as the author shows, an inspiration for our religious, ethical, and æsthetic life, and although he is gratifyingly independent of the dubious evidences of historical tradition, being rooted in rational thought, how does he fit into a world that contains not

merely so many neutral concretions but so much actual evil? The author devotes a chapter to this problem, but the results are ambiguous. "Evils occur," he says, "but they have no right to exist; they are not stable, not permanent, not enduring. Ethically they are not real . . . because they do not satisfy the criteria which determine goodness and ethical reality" (p. 144). "God is not the Creator of evil; because evil is a concrete thing or event . . . and he does not create concrete things. God creates realities, which are intelligibles and common objects" (p. 148).

Yet is not suffering both a concrete experience and an "intelligible" or "common object"? How can the author discuss it unless it is an idea he shares with his readers? Of course the idea of suffering is true and God may be responsible for its truth, but it is not always either beautiful or good. The fact is that evil is a "reality" even in the author's sense, and a more inclusive conception of God seems to be necessary if it is to be taken into account.

J. S. BIXLER

The Historic Mission of Jesus, by Cecil John Cadoux, New York, Harper, 1943, pp. xxiv, 376, $3.00.

The author of this book in his introduction takes account of the recent work on the teaching of Jesus, whether liberal, eschatological, or Barthian, and then sets himself to re-examine the whole matter. He accepts Streeter's documentary theory, and the whole work is affected by the strong reliance on the historical value of the sources so identified. With this goes not only a coolness to form criticism but a disinclination to accept the view that the tradition embodied in these sources has been radically affected by the experience of the church. A second important factor in the whole work is mentioned in the introduction, namely, the author's conviction that Jesus had a concrete concern for practical issues in the political situation of his people.

Part I deals with Jesus' view of himself as "The Bringer of the Kingdom of God." Dr. Cadoux concludes that Jesus was conscious of being the Messiah. Most significant, however, was his thought of himself as both *suffering servant* and *son of man,* the latter in terms of Ezekiel and Daniel—that is, with the connotations of the leader and representative of the *remnant.* Part II deals with "The Nature and Presence of the Kingdom of God." Notable here is his acceptance of both present and future aspects of the kingdom, and stress on the political significance of the kingdom. Jesus as Messiah assigned himself a national rôle, and he foresaw a coming of the kingdom *on earth.*

Part III deals with "The Future of the Kingdom as First Envisaged," and Part IV with it as "last envisaged." At first Jesus expected to win his people to repentance and to a successful testimony to the gentile world such as would obviate the national disaster then threatening. Later Jesus sees that his message is rejected by the nation, that he will have to die, and that the people faces political disaster. He anticipates, however, that his death will lead many to repentance and that through them the kingdom will make its way to the Roman empire. In both periods Jesus announces the ultimate consummation in apocalyptic terms, though Cadoux denies that the new age would be of fully transcendental or heavenly character. In his interesting conclusion, the value of which is independent in many respects of the limitations of the bulk of the book, the author deals with larger questions as to the meaning of eschatology and its permanent values.

The extensive citation and comparison of works dealing with the outlook of Jesus, and the systematic and ample treatment, give value to this work as a compendium. Numerous matters of detail succeed each other, in text and footnotes, that

will interest informed readers. Particular value inheres in the new consideration of the point of view formerly stated by Stephen Liberty in his book, *The Political Relations of Christ's Ministry.* Cadoux makes a persuasive case for the likelihood that whatever ultimate and "spiritual" teaching Jesus reached, it had its ground in the immediate actualities and options of the situation of his people. Others have recognized his concern with the social actualities. Cadoux might well have included this. But if Jesus' work sprang out of concrete social actualities, we may equally well assign him a clairvoyant and concrete awareness of political issues. At this point, however, Cadoux faces the difficult task of relating the eschatology of Jesus—to which he gives full value—to any such political realism. Cadoux's unique distinction here between an earlier and a later expectation on the part of Jesus with regard to the conversion of Israel and its service to the Roman world, seems to be an unsuccessful solution of the problem, as is his distinction between a this-worldly evangelization of the empire and a final consummation. Cadoux has rightly recognized both the historical and transcendental reference of Jesus' outlook on the future. Two solutions are possible. Cadoux's solution is to set them in chronological relation: first an historical fulfillment and then the transcendental. The wiser solution, perhaps, is to see the two references as counterparts one of the other. That is, Jesus expected an historical actualization of the kingdom, but he could only describe it in transcendental not political terms.

Apart from this special interest of the author, however, the main body of the book—that dealing with the details of Jesus' self-consciousness and outlook—is generally subject to question because of the suppositions about the records and the gospel traditions. Dr. Cadoux reposes confidence in a mass of sayings of Jesus and incidents of his life that are surely dubious. One cannot but regret that so extensive a task should have been carried out on the basis of critical views widely abandoned today, particularly because the special thesis we have spoken of above thus loses in its persuasiveness.

AMOS N. WILDER

The Varieties of New Testament Religion, by Ernest F. Scott, New York, Scribner, 1943, pp. vii, 310, $2.75.

The preface states that the purpose of this book is to show that various types of teaching are represented in the New Testament and that these types are not closely related and cannot be fitted into a single pattern. The book does not achieve its purpose, but rather confuses variety with uniformity beyond this reviewer's power to untangle them. The reader will gain a clearer view of the varieties of New Testament religion from reading the New Testament itself; moreover, he will find much clearer and more cogent statements of Mr. Scott's views in his earlier books.

Contradictions and lack of clear definitions are responsible for the book's failure. No real diversity is admitted, but neither at the last is any real unity admitted. Unity existed in primitive Christianity as personal loyalty to Christ and in a common and unchanging ethic (p. 26); but "The unity of the church was a dream even in those first days . . . . In the world-wide church of to-day no true unity is conceivable; and this is no matter for regret . . . . There will be endless differences as each one holds fearlessly to the truth that is in him, but out of this division will come the only unity which is worth our struggle" (p. 305).

The preface and the final paragraph, from which the preceding quotations are taken, seem to guarantee real diversity. But the reader is assured that the revelation in Jesus was complete; *e. g.,* his teaching of the kingdom had *all* the later interpreta-

tions in it (pp. 11 f.). The facts of the Christian faith were universally accepted. These facts had diverse interpretations, but the interpretations were all true (p. 17). The early Christians "were not disturbed when they found themselves differing from each other"! (p. 18). For "the gospel remained one" (p. 19), and every Christian knew it. Moreover, "In all times the Christian ethic has been the constant factor in the Christian religion. Doctrines and modes of worship have been constantly changing, but the idea of how the Christian man should act has never varied" (p. 26).

These inconsistencies can be illustrated in general and in detail. The statement quoted just above from p. 26 is contradicted flatly on p. 195: "To some extent in its substance, as in its expression the Christian ethic was modified by Gentile influence. Pagan virtues were added to those which were strictly Christian, and were included henceforth in the conception of the moral life." Similarly, the chapter on "The Rise of a Common Religion" speaks of a "uniformity which was at last achieved" (p. 287) in that the Christians "had grown aware that the message was large enough to admit of many interpretations" (p. 288). Yet on pp. 18 and 36 this is claimed for the primitive period.

A clear example of assertion and qualification which blur the message of this book is found in the discussion of the Epistle of James. We are told on p. 210 that "Right action was now severed from its religious springs, and became . . . a mechanical obedience to a number of stated rules." Two pages later, we find this retracted: "With all his insistence on ethic he appeals to us in the name of religion . . . . He takes the best morality he knows, and makes it one in substance with the Christian religion."

This is an equivocal and confusing book throughout. It is, therefore, gratuitous to quibble over details. Yet I cannot refrain from questioning some of the sweeping assertions. If it was a universally accepted fact that Jesus offered himself as the Messiah, why is there no clear statement of this in the first three gospels? The reference to the cross as the inevitable Christian symbol on p. 25 suggests that this happened in the New Testament period. Was there no conflict between the law and the gospel in Jesus' teaching or the primitive preaching (p. 38)? How can this be harmonized with the assertion that primitive Christianity was never Jewish; but, rather, human? Did anti-Semitism vanish in the Roman empire because Jews and gentiles had to live together in the cities (p. 63)? This book will be of little help to the student of the New Testament unless it stimulates him to more careful discrimination in the statement of the results of his study.

ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL

The Thrill of Tradition, by James Moffatt, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. x, 201, $2.00.

To read this book is to find the enjoyment and insight, the literary skill and spiritual penetration which we associate with Moffatt. Here is the colorful warp of the author's thought with an encyclopædic woof of other writers. The late Professor Ropes once urged us in class to check the references in books and thereby to learn much of the methods and resources of the author. To locate Moffatt's quotations is an enlightening labor. Not many men can range so confidently over the long landscapes of tradition. Nor would many call it a "thrill." In fact "thrill" in the title was a hurdle to the reviewer even as occasional figures of speech ("rock of ages," p. 156) needed definition more than a halo. Not intended as homiletic help, still the iron of this volume will strike many a spark from ministerial flint. "A point of view ought to be pointed." "Church services may be profaned by those who administer them."

Beginning in the pre-Christian period, Moffatt gives ample definition and illustration of tradition and its functions. Tradition is a "source and resource of life," "the pulse of the timeless in time." Traditions belong in the world of action. For the first Christians, "testimony to the Lord in word and deed, a living and loyal response to His revelation of God, is the beating pulse of their tradition."

"From the very first Christianity and tradition had lived together for better or worse." Tradition meant the apostolic message of faith and the rule of faith and the usages of worship and polity. But this body had a spirit which supplemented the Scripture as a source of revelation. While tradition was expected to confirm the word, succeeding centuries show the encroachment of oral tradition and the decline of the use of Scripture as a living revelation for all believers. In this historical discussion the Latin influence with its great stress on the customs of the *maiores* receives too little credit as a conservative force in molding the church tradition into a dominant position.

Amid the ambiguities of the Council of Trent one point emerges clearly. Written Scripture and unwritten tradition stand on an equal basis, and the church becomes custodian and interpreter of Bible and tradition as twin sources of true dogma. Protestant leaders labored to restore the original use of Scripture as a medium for the saving truth of God, while the individual was guided by the Spirit.

In the last two chapters Moffatt makes his best contributions for religion today. Religion finds its way between the extremes of reactionary and revolutionary. The latter sacrifices experience on the altar of novelty and hope. The former substitutes formalism and consecrated jargon for moral obedience and religious power. A living faith requires things new and old. We need to be more aware of our debt to the past where some action of God is celebrated which is both in and above history. "The power of appreciating the gospel testimony lies with those who are able and willing to reach back into the living past in order to secure some fresh applications of the text for today." "The real presence of the Lord is revealed to His people as their lives touch the needs of others." The living tradition in the church unites us in fellowship and worship where we learn as nowhere else what we owe to God and to one another.

DWIGHT MARION BECK

Church and State in Education, by William Clayton Bower, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1944, pp. v, 103, $1.00.

This expansion of the James R. Richard Lectures in Christian Religion (delivered at the University of Virginia in November, 1943, and beautifully printed) is a *multum in parvo* discussion of an acute American problem. It is a brave and eloquent defense of the public schools and American teachers against the silly charge of being "godless." Sectarian zealots will find no comfort in these pages. This is no brief for the introduction of "inspired Bible" courses into the curriculum of public education.

> Despite the fact that the schools do not formally teach religion, they are anything but godless. Not a few observers are even convinced that religion is a more vital experience in some state universities than in some church-related colleges (p. 77).

And this is how formal teaching of religion made its exit from the public schools:

> As we have seen, it was this sectarianism of religion in America that caused the exclusion of religion from public education, and not religion as such. It would appear perfectly obvious that there is at the present time no more hope of public education's including sectarian religion than there was at the time when in the interests of the public good it was originally excluded. Unless religion can be dissociated from its sectarian elements, there would appear to be no hope of solving the present dilemma! (p. 47).
>
> Subsequent experience indubitably proves that the original solution was right in excluding sectarian religion from public education (p. 59).

The author is also pessimistic over contemporary attempts to solve the problem by way of weekday religious education or the parochial school systems (p. 38).

What, then, does Professor Bower propose? A functional interpretation of religion and the indirect incorporation of its values in public education:

> 1. "Religion should be objectively dealt with wherever it is encountered in the subject matter of the regular curriculum";
>
> 2. "Religion may well be included in public education as a field of knowledge comparable with the fields of literature, natural science, history, philosophy, the social sciences, and the arts";
>
> 3. "The school can give the growing person an actual experience of the higher spiritual values involved in the relationships of the school community";
>
> 4. "The school can do much in the cultivation of religious attitudes by the use of ceremonials and celebrations";
>
> 5. "Public education will do well to explore the possibilities of religion as a principle of the integration of education and the culture which education seeks to interpret";
>
> 6. "The school, as is increasingly being done, can use the resources of religion in its rapidly expanding program of personal counseling" (pp. 60-71).

But all of these things public education has ever done! The author admits it for point six. And his colleague, Professor Chave, has put on record that ten religious values are found in contemporary public education:

> A sense of the worth of persons, development of social sensitivity, growth in appreciation of the universe, growth in the discrimination of values, growth in the sense of responsibility and accountability, recognition of the need for coöperative fellowship, recognition that the quest for truth and the realization of ideals is a slow and endless pursuit, development of a working philosophy of life, observance of special times and ceremonies, and development of adequate means of expression of spiritual values and goals (p. 66).

Hence, it is so strange that at p. 71, the author begins a section in which he observes how difficult it will be to introduce his plan into public education! Yes, it is a hopeless undertaking since his proposed plan has been a natural growth within public education! It is already there. But when the sects come upon this hidden fact and discover that Professor Bower's view of religion is "developmental" and not *semper ubique idem*, not "revelation," not "the verbally inspired Bible," will they not rise in revolt against his proposal? What a sect means by religion is its particular brand of Christianity, which any historical discussion would destroy. And the *National Catholic Almanac* lists all Protestant groups as heresies! What a devout Catholic means by religion is not Christianity but Roman Catholicism. "Religion as an objective form of social behavior is . . . something to be understood in its nature and function and not something to be defended or made the subject of propagandist support." Yea, verily, in postgraduate university seminars and clubs but not in the "Christianity" of the sects, in Bible schools, in theological seminaries, in ordination papers. Such attenuated, scientific, historical religion taught in the public schools would bring the wrath of God upon them before the first mid-term examinations.

If the orthodox ever discover these lectures and the advanced and heretical nature of the interpretation of religion here advocated, they will place it on their index of rejected books. Meanwhile they will shout for it as the monks of Erasmus' day did for his criticisms of them. To be sure, the majority of our population has long shared

this interpretation of religion, but that majority is largely beyond the membership of the churches.

One wonders why the author did not point out that "secularization" dates from the rise of Protestantism rather than from the birth of the United States. Since "secularization" merely signifies the diffusion of the values of religion beyond the organized churches, what is so damaging about it? In so brief a discussion no full analysis of the American situation can be demanded. Yet how could Dr. Bower fail to do justice to the radicalism inherent in the adoption of the First Amendment?

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

The Rise of Christian Education, by Lewis J. Sherrill, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xi, 349, $2.50.

Though Dean Sherrill's book is by title and subject matter a history of Christian education through fourteen centuries, it has decisive implications for a philosophy of Christian education as well. He sees the church's educational program in our generation as a contemporary phase of a long historical process, conditioned by the antecedents of that process and taking on new directions and new qualities under the changing influences of the modern world. Therefore, he is convinced that it is realistically impossible to speak of Christian education in general and abstract terms. Instead, it must be thought of as the Christian education of specific periods of historic Christianity. This is true because the Christian education of any given period derives directly from the nature of Christianity as living religion during that period.

Having dealt with its origins in Jewish education, the author's method is to trace Christian education through the broader historical phases of the developing Christian movement: 1. in the religion and teaching of Jesus as the founder; 2. in primitive Christianity; 3. in the ancient church; and 4. in the mediæval church. During these successive periods the Christian religion underwent profound transformations. With Jesus it was the personal response of free persons to God. It retained much of this autonomy in the inspired community of the early church, though a decided shift began to occur from a personal response to God to acceptance of an objective body of belief about Jesus and God as formulated in credal statements of "the faith." In the ancient church religion moved still farther away from a personal response toward abstract theological speculation, sacraments as mediating channels of divine grace, and a hierarchy of religious functionaries operating within the framework of an autocratic church. During the fullest development of this tendency toward symbolism and metaphysical abstraction in the Middle Ages Christian education declined to its lowest level. As a result of this historical development the religion and teaching of Jesus was reversed, an authoritative and external tradition being substituted for an immediate and creative experience of God in terms of the realities of present living.

From these historical data the author deduces his philosophical implications for contemporary Christian education: 1. that the criterion of Christian education is its effect upon free persons; 2. that if Christian education is to be in accord with education as conceived and practiced by Jesus it must spring from a living Christian religion that derives from a realistic and immediate experience of God under the conditions of the modern world; and 3. it must find a way to integrate the freedom of the autonomous person and community with the social control necessary to the functional unity and effectiveness of the church.

The Rise of Christian Education is a competent piece of historical writing,

solidly grounded upon fact, well documented from original sources, and revealing penetrating insight into the nature of the historical process. It fills a long-felt need in the literature of religious education. From the reviewer's point of view, the author's use of the historical method and his philosophical insights into the data derived therefrom are both educationally and religiously sound and important. It is to be hoped that the second projected volume dealing with Christian education in the Reformation and subsequent periods will presently be forthcoming.

WILLIAM CLAYTON BOWER

The Great Century: In Northern Africa and Asia, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, New York, Harper, 1944, pp. ix, 502, $4.00.

This sixth volume of Dr. Latourette's *History of the Expansion of Christianity* maintains the high standard of the preceding five. The former have been heralded as perhaps the greatest contribution of any one author to a record of the services rendered by the church to mankind during those long centuries lying beyond the bounds of possible participation on the part of any person living today. This volume not only tells the story of the lives and achievements of many whose accomplishments in carrying the Christian message and organization to the far corners of the earth are still fresh in our memories but also portrays the equally thrilling adventures and attainments of many of our contemporary ambassadors of the Christ.

No mission field and no missionary enterprise of the church, whatever its division, has escaped the attention of the author. The great continents, the hidden, almost unknown, parts of the earth, and the isles of the sea have engaged his thorough, comprehensive study and his careful, vivid description of the endeavors and successes of Christianity in this gospel ministry. Not one of its varied forms has been neglected. Not only the traditional missionary—the preacher—but also the teacher, the educator, the translator, the printer, the medical practitioner, the agriculturist has each received his merited recognition. Every means which Christianity has employed to bring enlightenment, enrichment, and larger freedom to the races of the world is cited and amply recorded.

One of the valuable factors of the book is the social and historical study of each territory reviewed as a background for the planting and nurture of Christianity. The geographical position, the economic order, and the political organization of all localities are well presented, so that the character of the missionary labor and its progress may the more clearly be understood. Not always has the political situation been advantageous to the cause of Christian advance.

It must also be stated that Dr. Latourette does not hesitate to point out the mistakes the church has made in this noble endeavor of "the great century," so true in its vision, purpose, and sacrifice to the great centuries that have gone. Missionaries and executives of societies are, after all, very human, and this historian is sympathetic and tolerant toward them. He, too, has served faithfully upon the foreign field.

The Great Century of Christianity's Expansion, 1800-1914, will be an invaluable source book in missionary information for many years to come.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

Contemporary Thinking About Jesus: An Anthology, compiled by Thomas S. Kepler, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1944, pp. 429, $3.50.

This book is a companion volume to the author's *Contemporary Religious Thought* and bears further witness to Dr. Kepler's extensive reading. Out of the New Testa-

ment literature of the last twenty years or so he has selected fifty-five persons whose views seemed to him particularly significant. They are represented each with a chapter of one of their books or an article published in some theological journal. The matter is divided into five sections: the nature of the Synoptic gospels; the portrait of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel; Jesus' relationship to history; eschatology and ethics; modern evaluations of Jesus. Two appendices give brief bibliographies for each of the sections of the book, and—what is perhaps the most interesting portion of the book—a biographical index of the authors. The material in each section is selected with the purpose of giving a diversity of views. No attempt is made to interpret the various schools of theological thought out of the historical and spiritual conditions of their age, as Schweitzer does in his *Quest for the Historical Jesus.* Dr. Kepler also refrains from taking sides in the controversial issues, thus leaving his uninstructed and bewildered reader to his perplexities.

To the reviewer this work seems to be symptomatic of the attitude a large section of the Protestant church is taking toward biblical scholarship. The publishers would certainly not have brought out this book, if they did not sense a demand for this kind of anthology, as do the publishers of the *Reader's Digest, World Literature in 1200 Pages,* and similar publications. The busy and overworked reader is thus enabled to talk about everything in the gospels and to discuss the progress of modern scholarship without being subjected to the hardships of studying the relevant works in the field. The compiler says he endeavoured to represent men and women from different schools of New Testament interpretation. But not many schools were admitted. One suspects that Dr. Kepler was unconsciously guided by the widespread prejudice that a man cannot possibly be able to think about New Testament subjects, when he believes that the New Testament proclaims a divine truth. The selections are made almost without exception from works which portray Jesus as a teacher of ethics and which are based on the assumption that the modern scholar has a surer grasp of the spiritual truth behind the gospels than did the evangelists.

OTTO A. PIPER

The Creative Delivery of Sermons, by Robert White Kirkpatrick. New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xi, 235, $2.50.

For more than twenty years I have tried to teach students to preach, and the result of my labors has been the conviction that to be a good preacher a man must have what the French call a "flair" for it. Just what "flair" in preaching is I cannot say, but surely it includes a sympathetic feeling for an audience, a vivid imagination, an eye for dramatic contrasts, a feeling for words, and a desire to share a great truth deeply held and appreciated. Without these things a man is bound to remain a pedestrian preacher, regardless of how good may be his material or how much of the mechanics of speaking he may understand and use. But if one already possesses this innate aptitude, there is much that can and should be done to cultivate it. Dr. Kirkpatrick, in this excellent book, surely points the way to that end. It is a scholarly study of preaching as an art and deals specifically with the delivery of the sermon.

The author believes, and I think rightly, that a sermon does not exist until it is delivered, just as a drama does not exist until it is acted. It is the delivery and not the material that gives a sermon its reality. Therefore, the sermon has to be "created" at the time of delivery. It is an expression at the time of the man's own mind and heart and moves from the inside out, which is the root meaning of "expression." This position of the author is reminiscent of the definition of a sermon given

by Phillips Brooks in his classic *Yale Lectures*—"the bringing of truth through personality." This rather general definition is broken down in this book into its modern psychological concepts.

After taking counsel of the way nature works in the wide range of expression that one notes in our daily conversation, the author comes to the conclusion that "the emotional mode is a more powerful means of expression than the intellectual." A man can impart only that which he deeply feels, and the purpose of preaching is to make others feel about the truth as the preacher himself feels about it. It is not so much what men think about the truth as what they feel about it that leads on to action.

The heart of the book is to be found in the chapter that offers practical suggestions for "creating the reality of the sermon for one's self." A brief sermon is presented and each sentence is considered in its psychological bearing on the delivery. The suggestions he offers are minute and disciplinary, and to follow them would blaze new trails in many minds in the work of sermon preparation. The unimaginative person would find them rather difficult to grasp. Not to overlook the mechanics of preaching, which are essential "to support the emotional mode," a chapter is devoted to the more familiar matters of posture, breathing, tone production, and enunciation.

This book is not designed for casual reading. Its instruction must be pondered and absorbed, for should one attempt to recall the vast amount of suggestion it contains, while delivering the sermon, his freedom of utterance would be greatly hampered. There is a brief summary of the argument at the end of each chapter, and an excellent bibliography is given for further reading. I should say that this book ought to be required for study by all who teach homiletics, and many a man who has been preaching for years will here discover why he has never seemed to achieve the effectiveness he desires.

CHARLES N. ARBUCKLE

Defensible Spending for Public Schools, by Arvid J. Burke, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. xviii, 379, $4.50.

Referring to the serious impact of wartime conditions which have caused conflicts between public-school management and powerful economic groups, the author observes: "Public school expenditures cannot be understood without considering the social, political, and economic ideals, policies, principles, and institutions underlying school finance. . . . Certain economic groups have ignored the democratic ideals underlying many public school expenditures. In the hope that full knowledge of such expenditure data will eliminate many errors at the source, this book is written." He achieves this goal admirably, for throughout the volume he points out numerous problems and areas under discussion, and repeatedly shows the large numbers of factors conditioning solutions in each. His treatment is fair, thorough, balanced, authoritative, never dogmatic, arbitrary, or opinionated.

Public-school revenues are omitted from this volume, as having adequate treatment in a number of good works presently available. This book covers school spending: (a) understanding public-school spending; (b) control and improvement of public-school spending. Both aspects are considered in relation to other governmental spending, to the country's economic system and condition, and to special factors such as the changed status of women, the trend toward urbanization, and the rise in living standards.

The control over public education and public-school budgets is one of the most serious problems in school finance. Centralization increases economy and efficiency,

while decentralization increases adaptability to new conditions and encourages democratization. While favoring local controls the author supports Federal Aid for education, the larger area being most able equitably to tap sources of money, as against the reliance of local taxation upon antiquated property taxes.

The discussion on expenditure trends reflects careful research and keen insight into causative factors. During the period of sixty years preceding 1930, the total school expenditures have risen by 3,500 per cent, most of this increase being accounted for by increased attendance, more pupils, and longer terms. Minor factors were new, expanded, and improved services, the changed status of the teaching profession, especially in the secondary field, and lowered purchasing power of money. For the future, the upward trend of costs will undoubtedly continue.

The author's discussion of the adaptability and equalization principles is among the clearest in current school finance literature. The former requires a lengthy definition, stressing essentially the ability of a school system to break with formalism and to adapt itself readily and satisfactorily to new and changed conditions. The latter principle would provide equality of educational opportunity over a large area, such as among school districts within a state, or among states within a nation. Each locality would have an equal local tax, the remaining funds to provide equality, coming from the larger taxing unit.

The strong sociological concept of school finance is revealed in the very human discussion of the economics of school spending: "It is probable that public schools with all their limitations really cost nothing, that is, they ultimately contribute more values and contribute more to ability to produce goods and services than the value of the goods and services presently consumed." Our high level of general culture has helped make us a people of high productive capacity, great consumer desires, and rapid scientific advance.

Part II discusses the improved technique and methods for handling school spending, emphasis being placed upon the philosophy rather than the mechanics of procedures. In the discussion of management emphasis is placed upon democratic organization of staff, and use of the best thinking of the citizenry, with responsibility resting upon trained professional leadership. He advocates both educational and business controls in the hands of the superintendent of schools, for "educational decisions usually affect spending more than financial decisions." The budget is primarily thought of as an educational plan, supported by, rather than merely consisting of, a detailed statement of expenditures and income. Prudence and economy may mean greater expenditures or smaller expenditures, wise leadership securing the maximum return for the needed spending, mismanagement of personnel being a large cause of waste. A program of wise personnel policies will attract and hold persons qualified as superior teachers, then provide them with living conditions, salary schedules, cultural opportunities, and satisfactions permitting them to render valuable and efficient service. Lower spending obtained at the expense of morale and enthusiasm, with a resulting feeling of insecurity, is waste, not economy.

In style, the book has an incisive clarity combined with a thorough treatment of each topic. It is concise, meaty, and authoritative, including in the appendix a guide to the literature of public-school finance, and a well-selected bibliography. For anyone interested in school finance, this volume provides stimulating reading. It is a "must" for school administrators, school board members, and laymen interested in the field of public education.

FRANK R. MOREY

American Catholic Opinion in the Slavery Controversy, by Madeleine Hooke Rice, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. 177, $2.50.

This study has long been awaited by students of the history of Christianity in America. The attitude of the Protestant bodies toward Negro slavery in the United States and the divisive effect upon them of that system have been fully and frankly presented by reputable and trustworthy historians. The facts of the controversies culminating in divisions, within the several denominations, between North and South, one hundred years ago, are to be discovered in the sources of the records of assemblies, conventions, and associations.

But in the very nature of the constitution and policy of the Roman Catholic Church these records are not so readily accessible to the research student. Questions such as these are not generally decided by debate in assemblies of the church but rather are made determinative through instructions and decrees issued by the official authorities as the policy for incorporation and practice of all concerned. Thus though the attitude of the church toward this social factor, threatening the foundations of the nations a century ago, was evident in the unbroken unity maintained during the period of stress, yet the actual mind and counsels of its leaders have not been assured by documentary proof. Dr. Rice has now after long research and meticulous evaluation published these facts.

The Catholic Church possessed a well-founded tradition toward human bondage when in the sixteenth century African slavery arose. Christianity began in a world in which slavery had long been an economic organization within society. At its inception, and for many years following, the church accepted this ancient institution. Consequently when the discovery of the New World by Spain seemed to make forced labor necessary, the church had its tradition regarding it.

On the one hand, slavery had been declared to be the consequence of original sin. This was especially true respecting the children of Ham. But, on the other hand, it was a well-established principle of the nations that a conquered people should not be enslaved. Negro slavery, therefore, but not Indian, came within the bounds of ecclesiastical license. Churchmen, thus remembering that slaves were nevertheless human beings, gave serious concern to their moral and spiritual welfare rather than to any consideration of their social status.

This was the attitude maintained by the church during the long period of the existence of the system in the colonial and national life of America. Not only were efforts made to minister to the religious well-being of the slave, but measures were also proposed seeking the limitation of the slaveowner's power, and the assurance to the bondsman of wholesome provisions for his physical and moral welfare, and the right, especially, of the joys of home and family life. At the same time, however, the slave was admonished to be obedient to his master and render the service expected of him under the existing conditions.

At the height of the controversy in the United States over the question, Archbishop Hughes of New York could write that God had permitted the development of the system in this nation. The only reply, therefore, to the question what is the policy of the church in these circumstances, is this, that "the teachings of the Church if strictly adhered to would sanctify at least in this regard both the master and the servant. The master by requiring him to be the head and guardian and protector of his slaves as well as of his immediate family. The servant by requiring that he should be obedient, faithful, moral and loyal to his master."

This, in general, expresses the attitude of the church toward the slave issue, though as the War came on Roman Catholics in the North were inclined, as were the

majority of their fellow Northerners, to support the Union cause. Those in the South followed the course of State rights. This accords with developments within the Protestant groups. However, few Catholics gave support to abolition in any form—the law of the land must be observed. Even the Fugitive Slave Law was upheld.

On the whole, then, Roman Catholics in the United States, as good churchmen, followed the counsel from Rome that the ancient policy be adhered to—loyalty and allegiance, primarily, to the doctrines and unity of the church.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

Group Relations and Group Antagonisms, edited by R. M. MacIver, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. ix, 237, $2.00.

This volume consists of fourteen addresses that were delivered during the winter of 1942-43 at the luncheon course on Group Relations and Group Antagonisms, held under the auspices of the Institute for Religious Studies. President Louis Finkelstein was the organizing genius and Dr. R. M. MacIver the editor. The problems of minorities in the United States, such as Eastern Europeans, Italians, Negroes, Roman Catholics, Jews, and the Society of Friends, and of others in Europe, Latin America, the Soviet Union, and India are ably discussed.

While the groups studied differ widely one from the other, the same causes, language, traditional customs, economics, politics, and religion, are found everywhere at work, bringing more or less hardship to minority groups. In America these are intensified by the indifference and the inhumanity of the majority groups. The problem found everywhere as stated by the editor is "the problem of relationship of people one to another" (p. 219). In general, all agree as to the solution; it is to be found in democracy that calls for a true appreciation of human dignity and moral equality as a first requisite (Shuster, p. 74; Finkelstein, pp. 85, 86; Steere, p. 98; Cole, pp. 152-155). The statements are sometimes vague, and in some cases may be undercut by other considerations. Integrated with this is the second requirement, *viz.,* groups must begin to consider each other democratically (p. 154), that is, there must be democratic intergroup living, in which the rights of groups are perhaps the most important part of the rights of man (p. 223). The emphasis that has been laid on the contribution of certain of the minority groups raises the question, May not the group be so indoctrinated in its private history (pp. 101-103), or so devoted to "convictions too sacred to doubt" (p. 74), that it may insist on the local and the temporary as the permanent?

The problem of the Negro in America, as stated by Alain L. Locke, is not one of assimilation. This group is one of the oldest in the country; their language and culture are American, and on every count they are conformists. Primarily the problem was, and is, economic, and today owing to the war they are entering, for weal or for woe, the militant phase (pp. 45-50). A most important side light is presented on this problem by Frank Tannenbaum in his study of minorities in Latin America. Here the bearer of European (*i.e.,* Anglo-Saxon) culture is the Negro, who in many places, especially in the West Indies, has made amazing progress.

A most encouraging note is sounded by Professor Deák, when he says that the influence of the radio, the movie, the present war, as well as some of the activities of the present administration, is epoch-making in hastening the assimilation of Eastern European groups into the life stream of the American Republican (pp. 21-25).

The volume is an appeal to recognize the rights of minorities, and it is well done. At times there is severe, but never unjust, criticism of the ignorance, indif-

ference, and heartlessness of the majorities. The discriminatory exclusion and immigration laws are criticised, but not beyond their due (pp. 62-66). But in going through the volume, one question has frequently come to mind: how often are the minorities themselves, for one reason or another, the aggravating causes of the bitter disappointments and the hardships which they are suffering? We have so developed the chivalrous tendency to fight for the underdog that sentiment sometimes tips the scale against justice. Recognizing fully that the inertia of old traditions abounds among us (p. vii), further studies of similar problems should be of real benefit to the public.

I. G. MATTHEWS

World Words: Recommended Pronunciations, by W. Cabell Greet, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. viii, 402, $3.00.

Here is one of the most useful, and at the same time delightful, books that has come across my desk in a long time. Reviews in these pages, it may be parenthetically remarked, do not invariably conclude with the obvious untruth: "This book is indispensable and should be on every minister's desk." The absence of the phrase is due in large part to the good sense of the reviewers, occasionally nudged by the editor's red pencil. It is a poor, at least unusual, editor who does not on occasion cheerfully break his own rules. Let this one be broken here. This book *is* indispensable for every public speaker. It was designed by Professor Greet, of Columbia University, for the Columbia Broadcasting System, to which he is a speech consultant. But it will be a godsend to ministers who have any interest in being even reasonably accurate in their speech, both public and private. To be sure, they will not often be confronted with the necessity of vocalizing *Kyaukpadaung* or *Medvezhya Gora,* as are their colleagues, the announcers and commentators. But there is much for them here. *A, advertisement, aerial, coupon, dinghy, economics, Eire, helicopter, Los Angeles, penicillin, ration, Roosevelt,* and *Stalin* are not too remote from clerical lips; most of them, however, elude many clerical tongues. Nor would the price of the volume be excessive were ministers to read attentively the little paragraph appended to *contact* (as a verb). What a pity that the author did not include a bit of instruction as to the use of *Reverend* or its little brother *Rev.* Perhaps he lives in that "ivory tower" which most professors are believed to frequent, and thus has been spared from listening to half-educated clergymen and politicians.

A year ago a somewhat similar volume, *War Words,* appeared, and was eagerly hailed. This volume is rather more than a revised edition. It is three times as large and contains more than ten thousand items. The introduction considers such pertinent questions as "Why don't we Anglicize all foreign names?" and is eminently sensible in its answers—but so is the whole volume. To this section the author appends with approval the word of the late Professor James, of London: "A technique that obtrudes, in speech as in most other forms of human activity, is offensive; it should be the aim of those who have to handle the spoken word to evoke neither admiration nor humiliation." Then follows an admirable series of summaries of elementary hints as to the phonetic equivalents in English of the several vowels and consonants in all the foreign languages in the news, from Albanian to Turkish. Unless I miss my guess, many readers will feel this section (pp. 1-39) is worth the price of the volume.

The body of the book contains the recommended pronunciations of the ten thousand or more names and terms. These are printed three columns to the page. In the first column the approved spelling is given, and is followed by an indication of the

nationality of the name or origin of the term, and in many cases by a brief identification. The second column gives the pronunciation (or pronunciations) in the simplified Websterian alphabet. The only addition to the symbols employed in Webster, and therefore presumably familiar to all users of the dictionary, is the ə, that is, the so-called *schwa,* representing the unstressed vowels, however spelled, which in speech are sounded "uh," as, for example, *a*bout, take*n*, penc*i*l, lemo*n*, circ*u*s. And it may be remarked that the item *schwa* will be read with interest by many who did not know that the singular looking word existed. Those who feel that Professor Greet has inadvertently given a surprising transliteration of a Hebrew term are advised to consult Webster on that point.

To many of these items are appended brief paragraphs of comment. All of these are illuminating, and all are written with a deftness and quiet humor truly delightful. When the book arrived, I opened it, expecting simply to catalogue it and then lay it aside for a more convenient season. I did not lay it down for rather over three hours—which meant that bedtime was that much later that night. But it was worth it.

Many will be delighted to know that Hitler is not the only prominent figure with a name not strictly his own—at least by birth. Stalin, too, is not the real name of our doughty comrade to the east. Thus now alongside *der Schickelgruber* we can speak of *Dzugashvili,* and pronounce it correctly, too. I was interested to observe that neither Goebbels nor Goering made the grade. I record this fact with neither applause nor protest.

All in all, it is a delightful book. Many of the books that are coming from the various presses bear patriotic paragraphs indicating that the "book is manufactured under wartime conditions in conformity with all government regulations controlling the use of paper and other materials." Most of such statements are quite superfluous, for only in time of war—a time of skyrocketing wages (but not salaries—when purchasers are forced to submit to shoddy substitutes at increased costs, could the publishers get away with the fruits of this "conformity" without reducing the cost. And in many cases a more intelligent "conformity" might seem to be the decision that the stuff printed was not worth even the poor grade of paper and docked margins. This book is not one of these. Content, format, material: all combine to make a splendid book. If broadcasting is to be seen as responsible for the production of this volume, one can perhaps be inclined to be more tolerant—or at least less enraged—at the "commercials" which crackle out over the air and into our ears with such little apparent justification, and with such execrable taste.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Challenge of Israel's Faith, by G. Ernest Wright, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1944, pp. ix, 108, $1.50.

Professor Wright has made a number of significant contributions to the study of the Bible in the field of biblical archæology. His *The Pottery of Palestine from the Earliest Times to the End of the Early Bronze Age,* 1937, is an extremely valuable handbook. His work on the pottery of Beth Shemesh is another contribution to science. Since 1938 he has edited the *Biblical Archæologist,* the best nontechnical periodical for reports of the results of archæological work which is related to biblical studies. He has been eminently successful in the mediating of highly technical material to the lay reader. In this present volume he has attempted to present a popular view of the theology of the Old Testament. It is directed to the layman who does not have training in the matters of technical criticism. He is concerned with the problem of

finding a relevance to modern life in the religious literature of the Old Testament. Judged by the standards of conservative scholarship his interpretation of the matter from the Old Testament with which he deals is acceptable. One is aware that behind the sometimes sweeping statements—with some of which the critical reader would beg to take exception—there is an understanding of the problems involved. Especially praiseworthy is his first chapter which deals with the meaning of inspiration. His definition is sane and liberal. The interpretation of the faith of Israel is marred somewhat by the intrusion of the author's own theological position, a position which can be defended from the Old Testament, as well as refuted thereby. The emphasis is upon the divine intervention to save man from his plight. On p. 92 he says: "But we may not think of that co-operation so as to consider *ourselves* capable of bringing the Kingdom among us. Only an act of God, saving and transforming us, can bring the ideal order into being. The prophetic point of view is against both the utopianism of the liberal and the pharisaic certainty of the conservative that he will be saved." Again on p. 86 he says: "Don't talk so much about co-operating with God, they would say; God is Lord and you can co-operate with him only by submission to his will." Wright would follow those prophets who did not place great confidence on human reason and speaks of the proclamation of the saving faith "diluted in the waters of overconfident rationalism" (p. 47). It is true, as Wright states, that "The prophets saw that the present order was so rotten and motheaten that there could be no hope of patching it here and mending it there through human intention and effort" (p. 82), but it remains that some did preach justice and mercy and right relations between men. Another point at which Wright might be criticized is that apparently he does not see any great value in the record of progress in the development of Israel's faith. The gradual, but sure development of ideas and principles from very feeble beginnings to a mature state is one of the most inspiring contributions of the literature of the Old Testament. It is difficult for one who has seen this long development, the many conflicts between different points of view in the Old Testament, to agree with the author that the book is "dominated by a striking uniformity in point of view" (p. vi). The book will serve to buttress the position of those who hold to the new orthodox position in theology.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

BOOK NOTICES

Date with Destiny, by Ralph W. Sockman, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1944, pp. 157, $1.50.

In this interesting and engaging little volume, Dr. Sockman dedicates his "Preamble to Christian Culture" to the indeterminate invisible audience in his far-famed radio pulpit ministry. But it is much more. It is a lusty call to all Americans everywhere to share his own passionate concern for a good and sufficient undergirding of the spirit, that ideas and hopes concerning a new and better world may have genuine foundation in their "Day of Destiny," which he hails as at hand. Those who have grown a bit weary of the repetitious emphasis upon the truth that we shall not get far toward the having of a new world without spiritual character may find in these stirring chapters no little of that realism and factual basis which alone make pretty idealism worth while. In the face of world-changing events, the author attempts simply to create an atmosphere of understanding and thus to reinforce sympathetically the grand hopes of harried mankind. Some will turn from the pages of this persuasive book now and then with the cynical remark that it is all so contemporary. It is true that *Date with Destiny* fairly reeks with awareness of the present. Churchill is much quoted, and others of the troublous "now." But it is all very much in point. For few there be who have not sensed the tremendous importance of these days for the future of civilization, and many there are who need the clear-cut sense of direction and aim which is here had for the reading. The undersigned humbly adds his name to the grateful. One of the special delights of this little book is in the fact that it is so characteristically Sockman. Preachers will be tempted to use some of his colorful illustrations. Phrase tasters will smile at some of his happy turns and quips. His incisive thrusts at smugness will delight the sophisticated, and his impassioned advocacy of the unmovable standards of the centuries will inspire gladness in those with a reverence for history. For its helpfulness in the realm of great purpose and for its inimitable incidental delights, many will count *Date with Destiny* a satisfying addition to the things which men call worthy.

IVAN MURRAY ROSE

These Things Will Last, by Stacy R. Warburton, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1943, pp. 123, $1.00.

The volume is frankly a statement of confidence that the Christian missionary enterprise will be continued with whatever changes in method or attitude may be necessary on account of startling changes in world conditions. The author was a missionary in China in early life, an administrative associate in an American board's office for a time, and is now a professor of missions in a theological seminary. Therefore, his recognition of necessary changes in the missionary attitudes, some of which are already under way, is all the more impressive. He recognizes universal elements in religion which furnish contacts with other faiths. So a sharing of experience and truth is possible. And among Christian forces unity is vital to the life of the churches in the mission field especially. Differences must be assumed,

but must ancient formulas be accepted? Are Western interpretations of Scripture final? "The churches of Asia and Latin America and Africa will set forth new views of Christ, new theologies and new types of church organization and life." Yet unity may be preserved. We must encourage new interpretations. Racial characteristics will enable various peoples to make enriching contributions to Christian life and thought and clarify the relation of Christianity to non-Christian religions. Christianity is by nature ecumenical. It should bring all national groups and national characteristics into a world unity. Evangelism will and must be a continuing feature of the world mission of Christianity, but might not a barrier for some be removed if a Christlike God were presented "rather than a Christ who is God"? But evangelism as such is only one phase of Christian missions. Disease, poverty, ignorance, and other social needs must be alleviated. And increasingly the leadership of nationals must be welcomed. A very excellent volume, justifying its title.

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

Studies in the Prophets, by Benjamin Oscar Herring, Nashville, Broadman, ©1944, p. 222, $1.75.

This book is chiefly an outline of the contents of the material of the English Bible classed as prophetic. In the introduction the author declares that "as little as possible of higher criticism" should be allowed to enter into the study of the prophets. In this the author is eminently successful. Having rid himself of the check of criticism, he is able to say, "when Isaiah was 'moved upon by the Holy Spirit' to speak 'from God,' his words were clothed with an accuracy and a correctness that allow no entrance of error" (p. 22). Professor Herring gives a discussion of the prophet's state of mind thus: "After all, the question of the prophet's state of mind is not one of a permanent mental gift; it is rather one of particular pre-visions, or more or less momentary experiences. . . . Haggai was not in this special Holy Spirit empowered state of mind every day and twenty-four hours in the day" (p. 22). All work and no play would have made him less than a prophet! The method of inspiration was not mechanical dictation, "but plenary verbal inspiration" (p. 30). It is hard to understand how the author can then hold, as he does on p. 45, that the writers of the prophecies "were no doubt dull of mind and understanding in some things, and fell far short of their right. So are we often." The roll call of the Old Testament prophets is a long one. Included are: Noah, Moses, Balaam, Hannah, Iddo, Obed and Azariah, Jonah (800-780 B.C.), Isaiah's wife, Daniel (602-543 B.C.). In the author's discussion of Jonah he does suggest the verdict of higher criticism that this is a late book. He argues: "The Aramaisms in the book have been pointed out as arguing for a late date, but they are no more significant in that regard than those in the Song of Solomon. . . . No reverent biblical student prior to modern times interpreted the narrative as parable or fiction" (p. 87). One original contribution is seen in the discussion of Ezekiel where the author says: "After arriving in Babylon, he established his home on the river Chebar. Maybe he liked to fish and to have the opportunities of meditation afforded thereby" (p. 184).

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The Jewish Passover, by Jacob Gartenhouse, Nashville, Broadman, ©1944, pp. 32, $0.25.

The author presents in easy, flowing English, much of it in the text of Scripture, the story of the Passover as reported to have been observed in Egypt at the time of the Exodus, and then as observed in the time of Christ, and again in our own day. He then indicates the relation between the Passover and the Lord's supper, linking Old Testament texts with New Testament interpretations. Due to space limitation, much of the detail with its gorgeous symbolism could not even be suggested. Nor could many of the changes that resulted from the radical crises in national experiences during Israel's history be more than indicated. Nor was there need of drawing attention to the dependence of the Passover on still earlier shepherd pilgrimages and sacrifices. Most of the important scriptural references are supplied, so that the thoughtful reader is able to fill in and reconstruct for himself much that could only be suggested in so brief an outline. It is a résumé that may be made the beginning for more elaborate study by those who wish.

I. G. MATTHEWS

BOOKS RECEIVED

Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. x, 491, $5.00.

This report contains a selection of the papers given at the seventieth annual meeting of the National Conference of Social Work. The subjects considered all concern the special situations created by the War: "Manpower to Win the War," "Social Work and War," "Social Security Now and After the War," "Social Work and Post War Planning."

Robes of Splendor, by Harold E. Dye, Nashville, Broadman, ©1944, pp. 200, $1.75.

Ten sermons preached at sunrise and vesper services at a youth camp by the pastor of the First Baptist Church, Las Cruces, N. M.

**In Quest of a Kingdom,* by Leslie D. Weatherhead, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1944, pp. 268, $2.00.

**Religion and the World Order,* edited by F. Ernest Johnson, New York, Harper, 1944, pp. 223, $2.00.

The Bible and Missions, by C. S. Detweiler, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1944, pp. 68, $0.40.

Six studies which "seek to uncover some of the many springs to missionary action found in the Bible." Abraham, David, Ruth, Jonah, Jesus, Paul (especially his letter to Philemon) are the author's main quarries.

The World Responsibility of Baptists, by J. H. Rushbrooke, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1944, pp. 28, $0.15.

This booklet reproduces substantially the content of the addresses the author delivered in the United States and Canada during 1943.

The Soul and Its Life, by Oscar F. Donaldson, Boston, Christopher, ©1944, pp. 196, $2.00.

Every man at one time or another determines that he will see a book of his in print. Some are unwise enough to carry out their determination.

**The Saturday and Sunday Lessons from Luke in the Greek Gospel Lectionary,* by Bruce M. Metzger, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1944, p. 101, $1.50.

Humanism, by Gordon Kent, Golden (Col.), privately printed, ©1944, pp. 64, $0.50.

Frank and enthusiastic propaganda for the "religion of the postwar world."

Evidence, by Elizabeth Pinney Hunt, Boston, Humphries, ©1944, pp. 47, $1.00.

The fifth in a series of seven books of short but choice poems on contemporary themes.

The Quaker Meeting, by Howard E. Collier, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill, n.d., pp. 40, $0.25.

ABC's of Scapegoating, Chicago, Central Y.M.C.A. College, n.d., pp. 72.

A pamphlet presenting the results of a seminar conducted by the department of psychology at Harvard on a theme of perennial concern.

**Christianity and Democracy,* by Jacques Maritain, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. 98. $1.25.

**Slavery and Freedom,* by Nicolas Berdyaev, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. 271, $2.75.

**People, Church and State in Modern Russia,* by Paul B. Anderson, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. vii, 240, $2.50.

The Prayers of the Bible, compiled by Elinore Mapes Pierce, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1944, pp. 183, $1.50.

An uncritical compilation of prayers and references thereto in the Bible.

**The Voice of Norway,* by Halvdan Koht and Sigmund Skard, Columbia, New York, 1944, pp. x, 313, $3.50.

**The Doctrine of the Trinity,* by Leonard Hodgson, New York, Scribner, 1944, pp. 237, $2.50.

**School and Church: The American Way,* by Conrad Henry Moehlman, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. x, 178, $2.50.

**The Ship of Fools,* by Sebastian Brant, translated by Edwin H. Zeydel, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. ix, 399, $5.75.

**The Trail of the Florida Circuit Rider,* by Charles T. Thrift, Jr., Lakeland (Fla.), Florida Southern College Press, ©1944, pp. 168, $2.00.

**Peace through Co-operation,* by J. Henry Carpenter, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. x, 113, $1.25.

**The Church and the War,* by Karl Barth, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. xi, 49, $1.00.

**John Dury,* by J. Minton Batten, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1944, pp. 227, $2.50.

**Origins of Academic Economics in the United States,* by Michael J. L. O'Connor, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. 367, $4.25.

* To be reviewed.